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We propose a methodology to detect and classify rootkit exploits.  The goal of this 
research is to provide system administrators, researchers, and security personnel with the 
information necessary in order to take the best possible recovery actions concerning 
systems that are compromised by rootkits. There is no such methodolgoy available at 
present to perform this function.  This may also help to detect and fingerprint additional 
instances and prevent further security instances involving rootkits.   A formal framework 
was developed in order to define rootkit exploits as an existing rootkit, a modification to 
an exisiting, or an entirely new rootkit.   A methodology was then described in order to 
apply this framework against rootkits that are to be investigated.  We then proposed some 
new methods to detect and characterize specific types of rootkit exploits.  These methods 
consisted of identifying unique string signatures of binary executable files as well as 
examining the system call table within the system kernel.  We established a Honeynet in 
order to aid in our research efforts and then applied our methodology to a previously 
unseen rootkit that was targeted against the Honeynet.  By using our methodology we 
were able to uniquely characterize this rootkit and identify some unique signatures that 
could be used in the detection of this specific rootkit.  We applied our methodolgy against 
nine additional rootkit exploits and were were able to identify unique characterstics for 
each of these rootkits.  These charactersitics could also be used in the prevention and 
detection of these rootkits.  We determined that our methodology would fulfill a need for 





Computers on today’s Internet are vulnerable to a variety of exploits that can 
compromise their intended operations.  Systems can be subject to denial of service 
attacks that prevent other computers from connecting to them for their provided service 
(e.g. web server) or prevent them from connecting to other computers on the Internet. 
They can be subject to attacks that cause them to cease operations either temporarily or 
permanently.  A hacker may be able to compromise a system and gain root access, i.e., 
the ability to control that system as if the hacker were the system administrator.  A hacker 
who gains root access on a computer system may want to maintain that access for the 
foreseeable future.  One way for the hacker to do this is by using a rootkit.  A rootkit 
enables the hacker to access the compromised computer system at a later time with root-
level privileges.  System administrators have a continuing need for techniques to 
determine if a hacker has installed a rootkit on their systems.   
Techniques and methods currently exist to detect if a certain type of rootkit has 
exploited a computer systems.  However, these current techniques and methods can only 
indicate that a system has been exploited by a rootkit.  There is no indication if the rootkit 
exploit that has been used is a previously known rootkit or if the exploit is a modified or 
new rootkit.  The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to detect new 
rootkit exploits as well as new modifications to previously known rootkit exploits.   The 
research includes the examination of the various types of rootkit exploits that are being 
developed by hackers as well as the use of a Honeynet to detect and characterize rootkit 
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exploits.  The goal of this research is to develop a methodology that can be provided to 
computer security personnel to identify and characterize rootkits 
1.2 Dissertation Outline 
The goal of the research is to develop and evaluate a methodology for detecting and 
classifying rootkit exploits. 
Chapter 2 summarizes the fundamental concepts involved in our research including a 
description of the various types of rootkits that currently exist.   We explore the particular 
characteristics of each type of rootkit.  Chapter 3 is an overview of the current detection 
and prevention methodologies concerning rootkits.  We examine general public license 
(GPL) tools that detect rootkits as well as programs designed to maintain system 
integrity.  We also examine Black Box Analysis as a potential method to detect rootkits 
and describe the methodology used at Georgia Tech for detecting rootkits.  Chapter 4 is a 
detailed discussion of our new formal methodology that we present as the core of our 
approach to detect and classify rootkit exploits.  We include a mathematical framework to 
define rootkit exploits as well as detailed flowcharts of our methodology.  Chapter 5 
presents the new methods we are proposing to detect rootkit exploits.  We examine 
methods to detect rootkits at the binary program level with the use of string signatures.  
We also examine a method to detect kernel level rootkits by examination of the system 
call entry point within the kernel.  Chapter 6 is a description of the Honeynet that we 
have established at Georgia Tech to detect new rootkit exploits.  In addition to serving as 
a research tool, the Georgia Tech Honeynet also helps to secure the campus network.   
We provide analysis on the data that has been collected by this network.  Chapter 7 
demonstrates the application of our methodology against a previously unseen rootkit that 
 
 3
was collected from the Georgia Tech Honeynet.  We conduct our analysis process against 
this rootkit and are able to identify specific characteristics for subsequent detections of 
this rootkit.  Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation and lists 




Origin and History of the Problem 
Rootkits are a fairly recent phenomenon.  Systems used to have utilities that could be 
trusted to provide a system administrator with accurate information.  However, modern 
hackers have developed methods to conceal their activities and programs to assist in this 
concealment [1].   Application rootkits install a program on the target system that allow 
for backdoor connectivity.  Trojan utility rootkits alter or replace existing system binary 
components.  These replaced or modified programs allow backdoor access to a system as 
well as the ability to hide the hacker’s presence on the system [2].   Kernel rootkits 
modify the underlying operating system kernel.  Rootkits are a serious threat to the 
security of a computer network.  Figure 1 is a listing of some currently known rootkits. 
 
01.linux root kit (lrk) 3-6 02. Solaris rootkit; 03. FreeBSD rootkit; 
04. t0rn (and variants); 05. Ambient's Rootkit (ARK) 06. Ramen Worm; 
07. rh[67]-shaper; 08. RSHA; 09. Romanian rootkit; 
10. RK17; 11. Lion Worm; 12. Adore Worm; 
13. LPD Worm; 14. kenny-rk; 15. Adore LKM; 
16. ShitC Worm; 17. Omega Worm; 18. Wormkit Worm; 
19. Maniac-RK; 20. dsc-rootkit; 21. Ducoci rootkit; 
22. x.c Worm; 23. RST.b trojan; 24. duarawkz; 
25. knark LKM; 26. Monkit; 27. Hidrootkit; 
28. Bobkit; 29. Pizdakit; 30. t0rn v8.0; 
31. Showtee; 32. Optickit; 33. T.R.K; 
34. MithRa's Rootkit; 35. George; 36. SuckIT; 
37. Scalper; 38. Slapper A, B, C and D; 39. OpenBSD rk v1; 
40. Illogic rootkit; 41. SK rootkit. 42. sebek LKM; 
43. Romanian rootkit; 44. LOC rootkit; 45. shv4 rootkit; 
46. Aquatica rootkit; 47. ZK rootkit; 48. 55808.A Worm; 
49. TC2 Worm; 50. Volc rootkit; 51. Gold2 rootkit; 
Figure 1: Previously Identified Rootkits [3] 
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2.1 Rootkit Description 
A rootkit can be considered a “Trojan Horse” introduced into a computer operating 
system.  According to [4], there are four categories of trojans: direct masquerades, simple 
masquerades, slip masquerades, and environmental masquerades.  Direct masquerades 
are programs pretending to be normal programs.  This type of Trojan applies to the 
Trojan Utility rootkit category.  Simple masquerades are programs that are not 
masquerading as existing programs but masquerade as possible programs that are other 
than what they really are.  Application rootkits may also fit within this category.  Slip 
masquerades are programs with names approximating existing names.  This could also be 
considered another class of application rootkits.   The fourth category is Environmental 
masquerades.  These are already running programs not easily identified by the user.  
Kernel rootkits would most likely fall within this category.  This research is primarily 
interested in the categories of Direct and Environmental masquerades.  In our opinion 
these two categories of rootkits pose the most significant threat to the security of a 
networked computer. 
To install a rootkit, a hacker must already have root-level access on the computer 
system.  Rootkits do not allow an attacker to gain access to a system.  Instead, the rootkit 
enables the attacker to get back into the system with root-level permissions at a future 
time [5].    Once a hacker has gained root-level access on a system, a trojan program may 
be installed on the compromised computer system. This may result in the overall security 
posture for that computer to be compromised.   All resources and data on that computer 
system are no longer secure. 
For example, a skilled hacker with programming experience most likely has the ability 
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to create a rootkit for a Linux type system.  It is easy to create this type of rootkit.  
Usually the rootkit developer will create a sniffer program.  A sniffer program can be 
fashioned from a program such as tcpdump [6].   
This program is used for password recording after placing the Ethernet connection in 
promiscuous mode.  The tcpdump program can capture all network traffic that passes 
through the Ethernet connection.  This may allow the hacker that installed the program to 
capture logins and passwords for other computer systems that are connected to the target 
system.  The hacker may then have the ability to install additional rootkits.  There are 
alternative programs available that have the same capabilities as tcpdump [6].  Figure 2 
shows an excerpt from a sniffer program that is part of the lrk4 rootkit [14]. 
int filter(void) 
{ 
 int p; 
   p=0; 
   if(ip->protocol != 6) return 0; 
   if(victim.active != 0)    
      if(victim.bytes_read > CAPTLEN) 
      { 
         fprintf(fp, "\n----- [CAPLEN Exceeded]\n"); 
         clear_victim(); 
         return 0; 
      } 
   if(victim.active != 0) 
      if(time(NULL) > (victim.start_time + TIMEOUT)) 
      { 
         fprintf(fp, "\n----- [Timed Out]\n"); 
         clear_victim(); 
         return 0; 
      }                                                                                                                   
   if(ntohs(tcp->dest)==21)  p=1; /* ftp */ 
   if(ntohs(tcp->dest)==23)  p=1; /* telnet */ 
   if(ntohs(tcp->dest)==143) p=1; /* imap2 */ 
   if(ntohs(tcp->dest)==513) p=1; /* rlogin */ 
   if(victim.active == 0) 
      if(p == 1) 
         if(tcp->syn == 1) 
         { 
            victim.saddr=ip->saddr; 
            victim.daddr=ip->daddr; 
            victim.active=1; 
            victim.sport=tcp->source; 
 
 7
            victim.dport=tcp->dest; 
            victim.bytes_read=0; 
            victim.start_time=time(NULL); 
            print_header(); 
         }   
   if(tcp->dest != victim.dport) return 0; 
   if(tcp->source != victim.sport) return 0; 
   if(ip->saddr != victim.saddr) return 0; 
   if(ip->daddr != victim.daddr) return 0; 
   if(tcp->rst == 1)  
   { 
      victim.active=0; 
      alarm(0); 
      fprintf(fp, "\n----- [RST]\n"); 
      clear_victim(); 
      return 0; 
   } 
   if(tcp->fin == 1)  
   { 
      victim.active=0; 
      alarm(0); 
      fprintf(fp, "\n----- [FIN]\n"); 
      clear_victim(); 
      return 0; 
   } 
   return 1; 
} 
Figure 2: filter utility for the lrk4 password sniffer program 
This sniffer will capture all network traffic that passes through the promiscuous network 
card destined for ports 21, 23,  143, and 513  (see underlined code in figure 2 above).  
Port 21 is file transfer protocol (ftp), port 23 is telnet, port 143 is internet mail access 
protocol (imap), and port 513 is remote login to host machine (rlogin).  All of these 
protocols usually have usernames and unencrypted passwords associated with them. 
The vulnerabilities that exist in modern operating systems, as well the proliferation of 
exploits that allow hackers to gain root access on networked computer systems provide 
hackers with the ability to install rootkits   System administrators need to be aware of the 
threats that their computers face from rootkits as well as the ability to recognize if a 
rootkit has been installed on their computer system.  Even for a hacker without the 
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requisite programming ability, there exists numerous rootkits targeted for specific 
operating systems available on the Internet today.   
2.2 Application Rootkits 
Application rootkits can be installed in several manners.  The application rootkit 
developer may try to deceive a user into installing an application rootkit on the target 
system.  This method may not provide the hacker with system administrator privileges on 
that system.  This type of application rootkit will most likely have the level of privilege 
of the user who installed the program and this may not be root.  Another method used to 
install an application level rootkit is for the hacker to somehow gain root access on the 
target system and then install an application level rootkit with root privilege.    
A hacker may choose to install an application rootkit on the target system.  The hacker 
will accomplish this by installing a program that will provide some type of backdoor 
access on the target system, usually with root-level access.   This program is normally 
some type of background process running with superuser, or root-level privilege [2, 10].    
These applications will not replace any programs that are currently installed on the target 
system.  Instead, the hacker may just install an additional application program on the 
system.  If the hacker only installs an additional application on the target computer that 
application and its associated output are the only elements that can not be trusted by the 
system administrator.  All other applications and output on the target computer can be 
trusted by the system administrator.  However, the original vulnerability that may have 
allowed the hacker to install an application running on the target system will still exist.  
Some hackers do patch a system after compromising it to prevent another hacker from 
installing an additional rootkit on the target system.  Figure 3 shows the level of trust that 
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can be expected to be encountered from an application level rootkit. 
 
 
Figure 3: level of trust in target system infected with application rootkit 
As Figure 3 demonstrates, the application rootkit program would be the only element in 
the target system that is untrustworthy.  These types of programs can be detected by 
numerous system utilities that are installed with most operating systems.  System utilities 
that monitor processes, tcp/udp port usage, and cpu utilization are example programs that 
could be used to detect application rootkits.  Example utilities include the Windows Task 
Manager in the Microsoft Windows Operating System and the list files and directories 
(ls), list processes (ps), and the display top cpu processes (top) in the Linux operating 
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system.     
It is significant to note that you must be able to trust these system utilities and the 
underlying system kernel to detect application rootkits using the system utility programs.   
If the system utilities and/or the kernel have been modified to hide the presence of the 
application rootkit, then other steps must be taken to allow for detection.    This 
dissertation addresses the detection and classification of rootkits that modify system 
utilities and the underlying kernel. 
An example of these types of rootkits are the Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K) and Sub7 
rootkits that affected the Microsoft windows operating system.  A more recent example 
of this type of rootkit is the blaster exploit that targeted Microsoft systems.  This program 
established a tcp port (4444) that provided System Administrator privilege access to 
anyone who connected to tcp port 4444.  Any malicious program with backdoor access 
via a tcp/udp port that is running with root privilege can be considered an application 
rootkit.  Although the operating system used in this thesis research was Linux, the 
methodology is directly applicable to the Microsoft Windows operating system as well.  
2.3 Trojan Utility Rootkits 
A Trojan utility rootkit can be considered a traditional rootkit. Traditional rootkits alter 
or replace existing system utility program binary files.  These replaced or modified 
programs allow backdoor access to a system as well as the ability to hide the hacker’s 
presence on the system [2].  A skilled hacker with programming experience most likely 
has the ability to create a trojan utility rootkit for an open source system.  It is very easy 
to create a trojan utility rootkit.  Modified utilities can be based on the source code for 
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existing utilities within the operating system.  The developer of the rootkit may also add 
additional features to the rootkit such as a sniffer program which we have already 
discussed.    A hacker may also add an application level backdoor on the target system 
and choose to hide the presence of this backdoor application with modifications to the 
system utility programs.   To modify the system utilities a hacker must have access to the 
source code for the standard system binary utility files [6].  This source code is freely 
available for various open source operating system to include Linux, openbsd, and 
FreeBSD.  Figure 4 shows the level of trust that can be expected to be encountered from 
an application level rootkit. 
 
 
Figure 4: level of trust on target system with system utility rootkit 
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As Figure 4 demonstrates, the system utility rootkit program has the potential to make 
all system utilities untrustworthy.   These types of rootkits may not be detectable using 
the original system utilities that are installed with the operating system since these system 
utilities may have been replaced by the hacker’s rootkit.  System utilities that monitor 
processes, tcp/udp port usage, and cpu utilization now have the potential to be providing 
erroneous or misleading information to whomever utilizes them.   
It is significant to note that since one can no longer trust the system utilities that are 
currently installed on the target system others methods must be used to detect the 
presence of these types of rootkits.    Some methods that are currently used to check for 
the presence of these types of rootkits include cryptographic checksum analysis and use 
of a known good boot disk with clean system utility files being used to boot up a suspect 
system.  These methods can tell you that a system is infected with a possible trojan utility 
program.  However, in most cases these methods do not provide an indication of which 
trojan utility program has infected the target system. 
Some example trojan utility rootkit programs include the Linux Rootkit (lrk) 4, 5, and 
6, the t0rn rootkit, and the li0n worm.  Limited capabilities do exist at present to detect 
the presence of these types of rootkits but these capabilities can be defeated by the use of  
non-default install directories upon installation.  
2.4 Kernel Rootkits 
Kernel level rootkits are one of the most recent developments in the area of computer 
system exploitation by the hacker community [2].    The kernel is recognized as the most 
fundamental part of most modern operating systems.   The kernel can be considered the 
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lowest level in the operating system.  The file system, scheduling of the CPU, 
management of memory, and system call related operating system functions are all 
provided by the kernel [7].  Unlike a traditional trojan utility rootkit that modifies critical 
system level programs, a kernel level rootkit will replace or modify elements of the 
kernel itself.  Since the kernel operates at the lowest level of the underlying operating 
system, all output from the target system becomes suspect.    
This type of rootkit has the potential to make all system output untrustworthy.   These 
types of rootkits usually can not be detected with system utilities that are installed with 
the operating system.  Even if these system utility programs are not modified the kernel 
now has the potential to provide erroneous or misleading information via a compromised 
system call within the kernel to the system utility programs on the target system.  
Application programs may also receive erroneous or misleading information when 
making system calls to the kernel.  This allows the hacker to control the system without 
others being aware of this.    Kernel rootkits usually cannot be detected by traditional 
means available to a system administrator to include file checksum analysis as well as 
detecting suspicious files and directories on the target system.  The file checksums will 
continue to match the database even after the system is infected with the kernel level 
rootkit.    The suspicious files and directories may be hidden by the system calls within 
the kernel.  The kernel now has the ability to hide files, directories and processes on the 
target system.   The kernel level rootkit can be set up to hide specific files and directories 
or a specific file hiding string can be established when the kernel rootkit is installed.  This 
string can be appended to the file and directory names that the hacker wishes to hide from 
the system administrator and other users on the target system.  This same method can be 
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used to hide files when a trojan utility rootkit is installed.    
Figure 5 shows the level of trust that can be expected to be encountered from a kernel 
level rootkit.   
 
 
Figure 5: level of trust on target system with kernel rootkit 
 
As Figure 5 demonstrates, the kernel rootkit program has the potential to make all 
kernel output untrustworthy.   These types of rootkits may not be able to be detected with 
clean system utilities that are installed with the operating system since any information 
that these utilities receive from the kernel can not be trusted   It is significant to note that 
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since one can no longer trust the kernel on the target system other methods are necessary 
to detect the presence of these types of rootkits.   We will now describe two sub-classes 
of the kernel rootkit. 
2.4.1  Kernel Level Rootkits that modify the system call table 
This type of kernel level rootkit modifies selected sys_call addresses that are stored in 
the system call table.  A kernel level rootkit can use the capability of loadable kernel 
modules (LKMs).  LKMs are a feature that is available in Linux [12].  A LKM can be 
developed that will modify select sys_calls to hide files and processes as well as provide 
backdoors for a hacker to return to the system.  These LKM’s also modify the address 
table of sys_calls stored in the system call table.  They replace the addresses of the 
legitimate sys_calls with the addresses of the sys_calls that are to be installed by the 
hacker’s LKM [13].   A sys_call on a system that has a kernel level rootkit installed may 
be redirected away from the legitimate sys_call to the kernel level rootkit’s replacement 
sys_call.  The Loadable Kernel Module capability is also available in various UNIX 
based operating systems [12].  An example of this type of rootkit is the KNARK rootkit 
developed by CREED and originally released in 1999.  The original version of KNARK 
targeted the Linux 2.2 kernel.  A subsequent version of KNARK has been recently 
released to target the Linux 2.4 kernel.   As previously mentioned, systems utilities will 
not work to detect this type of rootkit.  It is necessary to examine the actual kernel 
memory space to detect a rootkit that modifies the system call table.  Utilities do exist 
with limited capabilities to detect this type of rootkits, but all these utilities provide is a 
count of the number of potential system calls that may have been modified.  There is no 
indication of what kernel rootkit has infected the target system.  We have researched 
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incidents where these types of utilities that we have examined thus far fail to detect the 
presence of a kernel level rootkit that modifies the system call table installed on a target 
system. 
Figure 6 shows how redirection of the sys_calls is handled by a rootkit such as 
KNARK.   
 
 
Figure 6: kernel rootkit that modifies system call table 
2.4.2  Kernel Level Rootkits that redirect the system call table 
This type of kernel level rootkit redirects references to the entire system call table to a 
new location in kernel memory.  A new system call table is installed at this memory 
location.  This new system call table may contain the addresses of malicious sys_call 
functions as well as the original address to any unmodified sys_call functions.  For 
example, this can be accomplished by writing to /dev/kmem within the Linux operating 
system.  The Linux device /dev/kmem provides access to the memory region of the 
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currently running kernel.  It is possible to overwrite portions of the kernel memory at 
runtime if the proper memory location can be found.  Kernel level rootkits that redirect 
the system call table accomplish this by overwriting the pointer to the original system call 
table with the address of a new system call table that is created by the hacker within 
kernel memory [12].  Unlike the previous method that was discussed, this method does 
not modify the original System Call Table and as a result, will still pass current 
consistency checks for those utilities that examine the system call table in kernel 
memory. 
2.5 Summary 
We have provided brief coverage of concepts and exploits that compose this research 
problem.  These topics had some degree of influence on the outcome of the research that 















Current Rootkit Detection Methodology 
Techniques currently exist for a system administrator to monitor the status of systems.  
Intrusion detection systems operate at numerous levels throughout the network to detect 
malicious activity by hackers.  There are tools available for System administrators to 
detect if a system has been compromised.  The two primary means of detecting a 
compromised system are to conduct signature analysis on the system or to compare 
cryptographic checksums of system files with known good cryptographic checksums.  At 
the system or host level, a file integrity checker program can be run on the computer 
system in question.  While both of these methods are able to detect exploitation by 
application or Trojan utility rootkits they may not work in the detection of kernel level 
rootkits.   
3.1 Checking for Rootkits using existing GPL tools 
There are several host based general public license (GPL) IDS tools that look at 
changes to the system files.  These programs take a snapshot of the trusted file system 
state and use this snapshot as a basis for future scans.  The system administrator must 
tune this system so that only relative files are considered in the snapshot.  Two such 
candidate systems are TRIPWIRE and Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment 
(AIDE) [7].  AIDE is a GPL program available for free on the Internet.  This program 
operates by creating a database of specified files.   This database contains attributes such 
as: permissions, inode number, user, group, file size, creation time (ctime), modification 
time (mtime),  access time (atime),  growing size and number of links.    The system 
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administrator will designate which files and directories that are to be tracked by the 
cryptographic checksum program.  A system administrator would not want to designate 
files that are frequently changing, such as the log directories [8].  Figure 7 below shows a 
configuration setup for the AIDE program to track  MD5 and SHA1 cryptographic 
checksums for the /bin directory. 
 
 
Figure 7: AIDE Configuration 
 
However, a program like AIDE does have shortcomings.  Rami Lehti, in the Aide 
manual, states ”Unfortunately, AIDE can not provide absolute sureness about changes in 
files.  Like any other system files, Aide’s binary files and/or database can be altered” [8]. 
The presence of a kernel level rootkit would most likely not be detected by a 
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cryptographic checksum program such as AIDE. A kernel level rootkit may not modify 
any system utility binary files on the target system.  As a result, all previously calculated 
checksums would be valid even after the system was infected with a kernel level rootkit.  
The kernel may also provide correct checksums of modified binary files that have been 
archived before the selected binary files were replaced by the rootkit.  We installed and 
ran AIDE on a clean target system and then infected that system with the SuckIT kernel 
level rootkit.  We then ran AIDE in the check mode to determine if the SuckIt rootkit 
could be detected on the target system.  AIDE was able to tell us that something had 
changed on the target system, but it did not indicate that the system was infected with a 
rootkit.   Figure 8  show the results of running AIDE on a system infected with the 




Figure 8: AIDE result on kernel rootkit infected system 
 
Another free program that checks a system for rootkit detection is known as chkrootkit 
[3].   This program runs a shell script that checks specific system binaries to determine if 
a rootkit has been installed on the system.  In addition, this program checks to see if the 
network interfaces on the computer have been set to the promiscuous mode, which is a 
common ploy used by hackers to capture network traffic.  The program also checks the 
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system logs.  The shell script is signature based, therefore the signature must be known to 
detect if a rootkit has been installed on a system.  Programs such as chkrootkit may not 
detect new rootkits, and may not detect modifications to existing rootkits.      
We installed and ran chkrootkit on a clean target system and then infected that system 
with the SuckIT kernel level rootkit.  We then ran chkrootkit to determine if the SuckIt 
rootkit could be detected on the target system.  Like AIDE, chkrootkit was able to tell us 
that something had changed on the target system, but it did not indicate that the system 
was infected with a rootkit.  Figure 9 shows the results of running chkrootkit. 
 
 
Figure 9: chkrootkit results on  target system infected with a kernel rootkit 
 
Running chkrootkit on the infected system will only indicate that some form of kernel 
level rootkit may be installed on the system.  There is no indication of a specific type of 
rootkit being installed on the target system.  Note that the presence of the SuckIT rootkit 
is not detected (item 2 on list in figure). 
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When we began our research there was a program available to detect the presence of 
one type of a kernel level rootkit that modifies the system call table.  Samhain Labs [13] 
has developed a small command-line utility to detect the presence of this type of kernel 
level rootkit.   As we have previously explained, the kernel controls any application that 
is running on the computer.  If the application wants to access some system resource, 
such as reading to or writing from the disk, then the application must request this service 
from the kernel.  The application performs a sys_call passing control to the kernel which 
performs the requested work and provides the output to the requesting application.   A 
kernel level rootkit can modify these system calls to perform some type of malicious 
activity.  A sys_call in a system that has a kernel level rootkit installed may be redirected 
away from the legitimate sys_call to the rootkit’s replacement sys_call.   
It may be possible to detect the presence of a kernel level rootkit by comparing the 
sys_call addresses in the current system call table that exists in kernel memory (available 
via /dev/kmem) with the original map of kernel symbols that is generated when 
compiling the Linux kernel.  This map of kernel systems is available on the system we 
examined as /boot/System.map.    A difference between these two tables will indicate that 
something has modified the system call table [13].    It must be noted that each new 
installation of the kernel as well as the loading of a kernel module will result in a new 
mapping of kernel symbols.  A new kernel will result in a new /boot/System.map file. 
Figure 10 shows the output of running the kern_check program on a system infected with 




Figure 10: kern_check output of system infected with KNARK  kernel rootkit 
 
The output indicates that the addresses of 8 sys_calls currently listed in the system call 
table currently stored in kernel memory (/dev/kmem) do not match the addresses for 
those sys_calls in the original map of the kernel symbols (/boot/System.map).  If the 
/boot/System.map file is up to date, then the system call table has most likely been 
modified by a kernel level rootkit.  A file similar to /boot/System.map should be available 
on other Linux systems. 
The original kern_check program however, did not work with later versions of the 
Linux kernel.  This program used the query_module command to retrieve the address of 
the system call table within the kernel.  The Linux 2.6 Kernel will no longer export the 
system call table address.  This was done to prevent race conditions from occurring with 
the dynamic replacement of system call addresses by loadable modules.   Red Hat has 
back ported this feature into later versions of the Linux 2.4 kernel available for Red Hat 
releases so that it does not export the system call table address.  This may also be the case 
for other Linux and Linux-like distributions.  As a result, the query_module command 
will no longer be able to retrieve the address of the system call table in for some newer 
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distributions of Linux utilizing the 2.4 kernel as well as in the Linux 2.6 kernel [14].   
When we began our research in this area, the kern_check program developed by 
Samhain Labs was unable to detect kernel level rootkits that redirect the system call 
table.  We have modified the kern_check program, which is released under the GPL 
license, so that it is able to work even if the query_module capability is disabled as well 
as detect kernel level rootkits that redirect  the system call table.   We sent an email to 
Samhain Labs  discussing our proposed modifications to the kern_check code on 24 
March, 2003.  We will subsequently address the details of these modifications.  Samhain 
Labs released a new version of the kern_check program on 29 September 2003 that is 
capable of detecting kernel level rootkits that redirect the system call table [24].    The 
new kern_check program incorporates many of the methods that we also identified from 
our methodology of examining rootkits.  We applied this methodology against the 
SuckIT rootkit to identify these characteristics. 
A hacker may choose to target the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) within the kernel.  
In the Intel x86 architecture the IDT is a linear table of 256 entries that associates 
interrupts handlers with a specific numbered entry in the IDT.  Intel refers to each one of 
these specific numbered entries as a vector.  It may be possible for a hacker to replace a 
legitimate handler with a malicious one.  A program currently exists to check the 
integrity of the IDT on Linux systems.  This program was developed by “kad” and is 
known as checkidt [23].   Currently there are no published rootkits that target the IDT for 
replacement of an interrupt handler, but proof-of-concept code for these types of exploits 
has been published [13].      The fact that proof of concept code exists for this type or 
exploit requires that the IDT be checked for possible exploitation.  Other segments of the 
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kernel code may also be targeted by hackers for exploitation.  As a result, any potential 
segments of the kernel that have the potential to be targeted by a hacker will need to be 
checked for exploitation.   
The current state of the art in detecting rootkit exploits consists of a mixture of 
automated procedures and the manual examination of systems suspected to be infected 
with a rootkit exploit.  The primary automated procedures in use currently consist of file 
integrity checker programs and signature analysis programs in addition to a limited 
analysis of the system kernel.  If either of these programs indicates that the system binary 
files may have been replaced or modified, a manual investigation of the computer system 
may be necessary.  
3.2 GPL Programs Intended to Maintain System Integrity 
There are several host based GPL  IDS tools that look to protect the underlying system 
against rootkit exploits.  The significant point to note about these programs is that they 
must be installed on the target system prior to that system being infected by a rootkit 
exploit for these tools to be effective.  Installing these tools on a system that has already 
been exploited by a rootkit would only be counterproductive.  All subsequent checks on 
the infected system would indicate that the system was not infected since the baseline 
used to establish trust was an infected baseline.    If the presence of the rootkit on the 
target system were to be removed  these programs would indicate that the system was 
infected by some mode of rootkit.  This would continue to be the case until a new 
baseline was built against the target system. 
Two such sample programs are Samhain, developed by Samhain Labs, and StMichael, 
developed by Tim Lawless.    Both of these programs have the capability to perform 
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integrity checks on portions of the kernel to include the sys_call_table [25].   
StMichael is a loadable kernel module that is intended to protect the integrity of the 
Linux kernel.  As a stand-alone lkm, StMichael is used to detect the introduction of 
malicious code into the kernel.   StMichael will monitor select portions of the kernel and 
can optionally monitor the entire kernel [26].    Monitoring the entire kernel using 
cryptographic checksums may result in a performance cost on the target system [28].  
Rootkits have been written to defeat the monitoring capability of StMichael [27].   
Samhain is an open source file integrity and host-based intrusion detection system for 
Unix and Linux.   It has the following capabilities: 
• Conduct integrity checks using cryptographic checksums of files to detect 
modifications 
 
• Search the disk for rogue SUID executables 
 
• Detect kernel rootkits (Linux and FreeBSD only).  
 
• Run as a daemon process, and remember file changes. 
 
• Provides native support for centralized monitoring via encrypted TCP/IP 
connections to a central server. Checksum database(s) and client configuration 
can be stored on the server.  
 
• Supports logging to a SQL database. 
  
• Checksum databases and configuration files can be PGP signed.  
 
• Support for a stealth mode of operation. 
 
• For client/server installations, a web-based console is available as separate 
package.  
 
Samhain was developed by Samhain labs, the developer of the kern_check program 
[28].  Samhain is described as an impressive tool with powerful defenses to include an 
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encrypted and compressed executable binary, cryptographic support, steganographically 
shielded configuration files that can be hidden among files with GIF or JPEG format and 
the ability to be hidden in the kernel [29]. 
Both StMichael and Samhain are tools that can be used to maintain the system integrity 
of a vulnerable computer.  These programs should be installed on a system before the 
system is placed on line in a production environment [29].  Both of these programs have 
the ability to indicate that a system may have been compromised by some type of rootkit, 
but they do not tell you what rootkit has compromised the system.  It may be possible to 
use the characteristics of these tools (both are GPL products) in the development of a 
methodology to detect and classify rootkit exploits.  
3.3 Checking for Rootkits Using Black Box Analysis 
Black Box, or Dynamic Program Analysis is the method in which an executing program 
is treated as a ‘black box’.  The ‘black box’ is monitored to determine how the program 
interfaces with the operating system.  By treating the executing program as a ‘black box’, 
the instructions generated at the machine level are not analyzed.    The system calls that 
the program makes when interacting with the operating system are analyzed.   This 
allows for the monitoring of every file access, network access, and all other interactions 
with the operating system.   Many modern operating systems provide utilities to monitor 
system calls in real time.  Examples of these utilities include trace, strace, and truss  on 
UNIX type operating systems.  Utilities such as sotrace and ltrace, which monitor calls to 
library routines, also exist on some systems.   Monitoring system calls as opposed to 
monitoring machine instructions has several benefits, including less data to analyze and 
less of a slowdown of program execution since system calls occur at a lower frequency 
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than the frequency of machine level instructions.  It is also possible to filter on function 
call names or function call arguments [10]. 
One method of system call analysis that has already been studied is that of defining a 
”normal” or short range correlation in system calls for a process.   This research has 
developed a stable definition of system calls for some standard UNIX programs [11].  We 
had initially proposed the establishment of a “normal” for the system utility programs to 
establish a baseline for comparison between known good system programs and system 
utility programs that may have been exploited by rootkits.   
Using Black Box analysis we examined a system that was infected with a system utility 
rootkit that replaces select binary system utility programs.  The rootkit utilized for this 
analysis was Linux Rootkit 4 (lrkIV).  The system utility program that we choose to 
examine was the list directory contents (ls) command.  The ls command is intended to list 
the directory contents.  According to the README file for the lrkIV rootkit, the trojaned 
ls command is designed to hide files and directories that are listed in a specific data file 
[15].    We defined a ‘normal’ trace of system calls for the ls program to use as a basis for 
comparison for the lrkIV version of the ls program.   Previous research has demonstrated 
that the sequence of system calls in running processes should demonstrate a stable 
signature for normal operation.  This research established a window of size k +1 across a 
set of system calls for a particular system utility.  As this window was matched across the 
system call trace, a record was prepared for the system calls that followed at position 1, 
position2, up to position k.  A database of normal system call patterns was established 
using this methodology.  Subsequent system call traces were compared against this 
database to try and identify a ‘mismatch’ rate.  This research determined that mismatches 
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were the only observable that could be used to identify normal from abnormal [11].   In 
our case, the ‘normal’ or clean ls  command, made 87 system calls during execution.   
These system calls produced by the trace system calls and signals (strace) command 
listed in Figure 11.  We have removed the data from these system calls for brevity as well 
as only conducting one trace for the initial establishment of this database.  We believe 
that subsequent executions of the clean ls  command would produce the same results that 
are displayed in Figure 11. 
 
1. execve 2. brk 3. old_mmap 4. open 
5. open 6. fstat 7. old_mmap 8. close 
9. open 10. fstat 11. read 12. old_mmap 
13. mprotect 14. old_mmap 15. close 16. open 
17. fstat 18. read 19. old_mmap 20. mprotect 
21. old_mmap 22. old_mmap 23. close 24. mprotect 
25. mprotect 26. munmap 27. personality 28. getpid 
29. brk 30. brk 31. brk 32. open 
33. fstat64 34. fstat 35. old_mmap 36. read 
37. read 38. close 39. munmap 40. open 
41. open 42. fstat 43. close 44. open 
45. fstat 46. old_mmap 47. close 48. brk 
49. open 50. fstat 51. old_mmap 52. close 
53. open 54. fstat 55. old_mmap 56. close 
57. open 58. fstat 59. old_mmap 60. close 
61. open 62. fstat 63. old_mmap 64. close 
65. open 66. fstat 67. old_mmap 68. close 
69. time 70. ioctl 71. ioctl 72. brk 
73. open 74. open 75. fstat 76. fcntl 
77. brk 78. getdents 79. getdents 80. close 
81. fstat 82. old_mmap 83. ioctl 84. write 
85. close 86. munmap 87. _exit 88.  
Figure 11: Normal system call trace of ls command 
 
We then collected a trace of system calls for the lrkIV ls command.  We set up a data 
file to hide a specific file in a directory.  This system call trace consisted of 85 system 
calls indicating that this trace is a deviation from the clean system call trace that was 
produced by the clean ls  command and displayed in Figure 11.  The system call trace 
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listing of the lrkIV ls command is listed in Figure 12.   Deviations from the normal 
system call trace are indicated in bold text. 
 
1. execve 2. brk 3. old_mmap 4. open 
5. open 6. fstat 7. old_mmap 8. close 
9. open 10. fstat 11. read 12. old_mmap 
13. mprotect 14. old_mmap 15. old_mmap 16. close 
17. mprotect 18. mprotect 19. munmap 20. personality 
21. getpid 22. brk 23. brk 24. brk 
25. brk 26. open 27. fstat64 28. fstat 
29. old_mmap 30. read 31. read 32. close 
33. munmap 34. open 35. open 36. fstat 
37. close 38. open 39. fstat 40. old_mmap 
41. close 42. open 43. fstat 44. old_mmap 
45. close 46. open 47. fstat 48. old_mmap 
49. close 50. open 51. fstat 52. old_mmap 
53. close 54. brk 55. open 56. fstat 
57. old_mmap 58. close 59. open 60. fstat 
61. old_mmap 62. close 63. time 64. ioctl 
65. open 66. fstat 67. old_mmap 68. read 
69. read 70. close 71. munmap 72. brk 
73. open 74. open 75. fstat 76. fcntl 
77. getdents 78. getdents 79. close 80. fstat 
81. old_mmap 82. ioctl 83. write 84. munmap 
85. _exit 86.  87.  88.  
Figure 12: system call trace of lrkIV ls command 
The lrkIV system call trace removes nine of the original system calls and adds in seven 
new system calls resulting in a total of 85 system calls being displayed in the trace.  This 
is a direct indication that the ls program is deviating from its original signature system 
call trace.  These are the results that we expected based on the comments that appear in 
the README file for the lrkIV rootkit concerning the ls command.   
The significant change is the lrkIV system call trace occurs at system calls 65 to 71.  
This sequence of system calls does not appear in the original system call trace.  This is 
the sequence of system calls that retrieves the names of the files that are to be hidden 
from the ls command.   Examining the complete strace output to include both the system 
calls as well as the corresponding data shows this to be true.  Figure 13 shows a portion 
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of the output of the strace command on the lrkIV ls command. 
 
 
Figure 13: strace listing of lrkIV ls command 
 
The first open command in the figure is a call to the file /dev/ptyr.  This is the default 
data file the lrkIV rootkit uses to store the names of files and directories that are to be 
hidden.  The following read statement lists the filename that is to be hidden   (in this case 
it is a dummy file that we set up for testing named file.hide).   In the directory /test we 
created two files: file and file.hide.  Executing the ls command on this directory only 
displays one of these files (file).  This is demonstrated by the system call write near the 
bottom of the screen output, as well as output of the ls command in the bottom of Figure 
13.  The lrkIV ls command does not display file.hide.  This is the exact performance that 
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we would expect as per the lrkIV README file. 
We next examine the strace listing for the clean ls command.   We would not expect this 
listing to make an open system call to the file /dev/ptr.  Executing the clean ls command 
displays both files in the directory /test which are the results that we would expect.  This 
output is demonstrated in the bottom of Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14: strace listing of clean ls command 
 
The figure does not indicate a call to a separate data file.  The system call write displays 
the two files in the /test directory and the ls command displays both of these files as 
indicated by the output in the bottom of the display.   
These results demonstrate that Black Box analysis may be a viable approach for 
detecting the presence of system utility rootkits that replace binary utility files.  A stable 
definition of system calls can be developed for specific system utility programs as 
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proposed in [11].  Any system utility programs that deviate from this stable definition can 
then be examined to determine if they are rootkit system utility replacement programs. 
However, our research into kernel rootkits indicated that we may not be able to trust the 
results of the Black Box system call analysis if the kernel had been compromised.  A 
kernel rootkit can result in the ‘normal’ system call trace output even if the program is 
performing malicious activities.   
The strace output for the ls command for a system infected with the SuckIT kernel level 
rootkit as well as for a clean system is identical.  There are no added or deleted system 
calls within this series of system calls.   The strace output of system calls is identical for 
both systems.  A portion of the strace output as well as the output of the ls command on a 
test directory (/sys_call) is displayed in figure 15.  
 
 




The target system was then infected with the SuckIT rootkit.  The character sequence 
“.zk” was designated as the file hiding string as per the SuckIT README file [16].    A 
portion of the strace output as well as the output of the ls command on the test directory 
is displayed in figure 16.     
 
 
Figure 16: system call trace of ls command on a system with an installed kernel rootkit 
 
We have demonstrated by counter example that a system that is infected with a kernel 
level rootkit can produce a stable definition of system calls for a particular system utility 
(ls in this case).  We believe this is because information is being manipulated within the 
kernel as opposed to userspace.  As previously mentioned, modifications to the kernel are 
very difficult to detect using conventional methods. As a result, we felt that dynamic 




Research is currently ongoing in the area of kernel execution path analysis.  This 
research speculates that modified kernel functionality will result in a difference in 
executed instructions  between the modified and original kernel.   Modified kernel code 
would most likely perform additional actions to hide secret filenames and processes from 
the user.  These additional actions would result in additional instructions being executed 
within the kernel.   A baseline could be built to measure the difference between the 
number of kernel instructions executed by a clean versus and infected system [30, 31].  
This research would no longer be treating  the underlying kernel operating system as a  
‘black box’ but would instead be analyzing what was occurring within the black box.  We 
believe that in the future this methodology may have merit concerning the detection of 
rootkit exploits. 
3.4 Georgia Tech Methodology for Detecting Rootkits 
One methodology for detecting rootkit exploits is that which is conducted at Georgia 
Tech.  Brian Culver, of the Georgia Tech Office of Information Technology, described 
this methodology to this researcher. 
The Georgia Tech Office of Information Technology has the primary mission of 
providing technology leadership and support to Georgia Tech students, educators, 
researchers, administrators, and staff.   OIT consists of seven directorates, including the 
Information Security Directorate [17]. 
The Information Security Directorate is responsible for numerous tasks including:  
educating the campus community about security-related issues, assessing current policies 
and developing new policies, assisting in strengthening technical measures to protect 
campus resources, and developing mechanisms to react to incidents and events that 
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endanger the Institute's information assets [18].   There are 69 separate departments at 
Georgia Tech with between 30,000-35,000 networked computers installed on campus.    
The campus has two OC-12s and one OC-48 connection to the Internet, with an average 
throughput of 600Mbps.  Georgia Tech processes over four terabytes of data on a daily 
basis. 
Because of the high data throughput as well as the requirement for academic freedom 
and the research requirements of the various departments, the Information Security 
Directorate does not run a firewall at the Internet connection to the campus.  However, 
individual departments and campus agencies do run firewalls designed to meet their 
security requirements.     
The Information Security Directorate does, at present run an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) at the campus gateway to monitor possible exploits against campus computer 
systems.  This monitoring is done out of band and suspicious traffic is not terminated 
when detected.  Suspicious activity will undergo a follow-on investigation.  
Prior to installing the IDS the Information Security Directorate would investigate an 
average of five possible compromises a week.  The Information Security Directorate 
normally received reports of these compromises from concerned computer users.    Since 
installing the IDS, the Information Security Directorate investigates an average of five  
compromises a day. 
When a system that may have been compromised is identified, the administrator 
responsible for that computer is notified that the computer system is to be investigated.  
This is to prevent the computer from being tampered with, which could impede the 
investigation.   
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The system is booted with a known good media disk and the hard drive is mounted in a 
read-only manner.  The use of a known good media disk is also recommended by Chris 
Kuethe in his paper on detecting hacked systems [19].   A duplicate copy of the hard disk 
may be produced with a signature checksum in the event that the hard disk ends up being 
used in a criminal investigation.   The techniques used by the Security Directorate 
personnel at Georgia Tech may be unique to Georgia Tech.  The current state of the art in 
Computer Forensics Analysis does not provide a formal methodology for investigation 
[20]. 
The investigation begins by examining various directories a hacker may have 
manipulated to hide exploits on the computer system in question.  The log files are 
examined to see if there are any records of what was done on the system.  It is not 
uncommon for the log files to have no record of system modifications or to be deleted 
from the system.  If the log files are deleted, steps are taken to try to retrieve them.  Next, 
previously known directories where a hacker may choose to hide exploit files are 
examined.    The chkrootkit tool may be run to check if a rootkit has been installed on the 
system.   If these checks prove unsuccessful, the Security Directorate personnel then 
conduct a more detailed examination of the system.  For example, on a UNIX or LINUX 
operating system, commands such as ‘find’ or ‘locate’ are used to try to find directories 
that may have been used by the hacker when the system was exploited. 
If such a directory is located, then a listing of that directory occurs to see what files are 
present in that directory.    The file and strings command are used on these files to 
examine them.  The file command is run to try to determine the file type.  The output of 
the strings command is read to try and recognize any suspicious text strings that may 
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indicate what exploit was done to the computer. 
The /proc/ directory is then checked to see if a program is running in memory.  The 
process id numbers (pids) are compared between those listed by the report process status 
(ps) command (using the –ef switch) and those listed in the /proc/ directory.  A difference 
between these two listings indicates that the ps command was most likely modified by the 
hacker to hide the processes that the hacker has running on the computer.  The 
Information Security Directorate personnel use the /proc/ directory as a true listing of 
what is currently running on the system being investigated.   The processes that show up 
in the /proc/ directory but that are not listed by the ps command are examined using the 
file and strings command.   
The strace command may be used to trace system calls for suspicious program binaries 
left on the system by the hacker.  The print shared library dependencies (ldd) command 
may also be used to check on shared library dependencies of the suspicious programs, 
especially for those suspect programs that have the same name as known good system 
binaries.  A difference in library listing is determined to be a direct indication that a 
hacked version of system binaries is installed on the system. 
A similar methodology is used for other operating systems to determine if the system 
has been exploited by a rootkit.  We believe it is the case that in general, information 
security personnel have no formal methodology to determine if a computer has been 
infected with a new unknown or previously modified known rootkit without conducting 





We have provided a current overview of the current state of rootkit detection 
methodology.  We described and analyzed various GPL tools that are in use today by 
system administrators.  Our analysis identified the strengths, weaknesses and 
shortcomings of these tools.  The feasibility of  conducting Black Box analysis to identify 
possible rootkit expoits was then examined.   A shortcoming of this method was 
demonstrated concerning the detection of kernel rootkits.  The current detection 
methodology that is in use at Georgia Tech was then examined. The current state of the 
art in detecting rootkit exploits consists of a mixture of automated procedures as well as 
the manual examination of systems suspected to be infected with a rootkit exploit.    Our 
research indicates that there is no formalized method currently in existence to detect or 




Formal Methodology to Characterize Rootkits 
There is no current methodology at present to characterize rootkit exploits as existing, 
modifications to existing, or entirely new.  We believe that such a methodology would 
assist network system administrators in increasing the overall security level of their 
networks.  Requests have been made for such a methodology [32].  Our initial interest in 
this research area came about as a result of a discussion with the Technical Project 
Director for Security at the Georgia Institute of Technology.  System administrators 
would be able to characterize the threats that their networks would face.  For example, if 
a system administrator knew that a certain type of already known rootkit posed a threat to 
the network, that system administrator could take the appropriate measures that had been 
used previously to protect the network.   Appropriate measures could also be taken for 
modifications to existing rootkits.  Previous defensive measures could be utilized to 
protect a network if these measures could be validated against the modified rootkits.  
New methods could be developed for new capabilities that were introduced into these 
modified rootkits.  New defensive measures could also be developed for rootkits that are 
entirely new.    A system administrator could possibly associate a particular type of 
rootkit with particular exploit and then defend the network against this type of rootkit.   
New signatures could also be developed as a result of classifying rootkits as either 
modification to existing or entirely new.  Signature based intrusion detection systems 
must know a particular signature to classify an intrusion.  Such a signature may not exist 
for modifications to existing or entirely new rootkits.  Programs such as chkrootkit are for 
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the most part signature dependent when they attempt to detect rootkit exploitation.  A 
formal methodology that is capable of classifying rootkit exploits as existing, 
modification to existing, or entirely new is capable of providing new signatures for 
programs such as chkrootkit.  The classification of rootkits in this manner may also result 
in the identification of specific anomaly patterns that can be associated with a particular 
rootkit. 
The need for a formal methodology to characterize software weapons has already been 
addressed in previous research [33].  This research attempts to develop a taxonomy, or 
formal classification method for software weapons.  A premise of this research is that a 
research area will benefit from a structured categorization process.  We agree with this 
and the goal of our research is to develop a detection and classification methodology for a 
specific class of software weapon known as a rootkit which we have previously defined. 
This rootkit detection and classification methodology will result in techniques to 
characterize rootkits as well as new methods to detect them.  This methodology can be 
used throughout both the research and operational communities to increase the overall 
level of security of the Internet. 
We have developed a mathematical framework to define rootkit exploits as either 
existing, modification to existing, or entirely new.  This is necessary so that we have 
some formal method to classify rootkits.  Rootkits are a unique subclass of software 
exploits and Trojan Horse type programs.  A true rootkit should maintain the original 
functionality of the computer program or capability that it is intended to replace.  We use 
this characteristic in our classification and detection methodology.  We then describe the 
methodology in detail to include the establishment of a testing platform and the steps that 
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are necessary to perform our analysis to identify characteristics that can be used for 
rootkit detection and classification. 
4.1 Mathematical Framework to define Rootkits 
Methods have already been developed to attempt to classify various types of computer 
exploit code.  In Thimbleby, Anderson and Cairns [1] a preliminary framework for 
modeling Trojans and computer virus infections was developed.  This work dealt with the 
general case of viruses and Trojans.  This dissertation makes use of the ideas presented in 
that work to develop a mathematical framework to classify rootkit exploits.  The focus of 
this work is more specific in that it develops a method to classify rootkits as existing, 
modification to existing, or entirely new.   
A computer virus has been defined as a computer program that is able to replicate all or 
part of itself and attach this replication to another program [22].  The type of rootkits that 
we wish to classify does not normally have this capability so this is not a method that we 
could use to detect or classify rootkits.   A true rootkit program that is intended to replace 
an existing program or capability on the target system must have the same functionality 
as the original program or capability plus some increased functionality that has been 
inserted by the rootkit developer to allow backdoor root-level access and/or the ability to 
hide specified files, processes, and network connections on to the target system.  This 
increased functionality is provided by added elements contained within the rootkit.  The 
increased functionality of the rootkit, with its associated elements, provides a method that 
can be utilized to detect and classify rootkit exploits.  Rootkits can be characterized by 
using a variety of methods to compare the original program to the rootkit program and 
identify the difference, or delta ( ∇ ) in functionality between the two programs.    This 
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∇ can serve as a potential signature for identifying the rootkit. 
It has been recognized that evaluating a program file by its CRC checksum is both 
faster and requires less memory than comparing a file by its contents [8].  The results of 
this comparison will only tell you that a current program file differs from its original 
program file.  Using this check to detect rootkits would not tell you if this rootkit is an 
existing, modification to existing, or entirely new rootkit exploit.   It is also recognized 
that Trojan Horse type programs can be detected by comparing them to the original 
program file that they are intended to replace [8].  The approach we choose to follow is 
that rootkits can be classified comparing their ∇ against previously identified ∇ ’s of 
known rootkits.   
For our framework we assume that we have already identified a program as being part 
of a potential rootkit.  We are able to do this by using a Honeynet to capture rootkits.  In 
addition, we have a copy of the original programs that the rootkit replaced.   From our 
definition of a true rootkit we can assume that these two programs are indistinguishable 
in execution since they will produce similar results for most inputs.   Therefore, these two 
programs are similar to each other.  From [1], we recognize that similarity is not equality, 
we may not be able to recognize that the programs differ in the amount of time that we 
have available to analyze them. Two programs are indistinguishable when they reproduce 
similar results for most inputs.  A true rootkit should therefore be indistinguishable from 
what it is intended to replace since it should have the same functionality as the original 
programs it is to replace in addition to the new capabilities that were added by the rootkit 
developer. 
We also use the quantifiers, similarity (~), indistinguishable ( ≈ ), and the meaning of a 
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program [[• ]] that was presented in [1] and define them in a similar manner. 
• ~ (similarity) – a poly log computable relation on all possible representations 
(defined as R) of a computer to include the full state of the machine consisting of 
memory, screens, registers, inputs, etc.  A single representation of R is defined as 
r.  Poly log computable is defined as a function that can be computed in less than 
linear time meaning a representation can be evaluated without having to examine 
the entire computer representation. 
• ≈ (indistinguishable) – two programs that produce similar results for most inputs. 
• [[• ]] (the meaning of a program) – what a program does when it is run 
We presume to have two programs: p1, the original program, and p2, identified as 
malicious version of program p1 that provides rootkit capabilities on the target system.    
If p2 is part of a true rootkit then p1 and p2 are indistinguishable from each other.  These 
two programs will produce similar outputs for most inputs.    In a manner similar to [1] 
we can state that p1 is indistinguishable from p2 if and only if 
for most 21]]2[[~]]1[[: pprprpRr ≈⇒∈  
meaning for most representations of a machine out of all possible representations the 
results of program p1 are similar to the results of program p2 which implies that p1 is 
indistinguishable from p2.  
We will now apply set theory to show a method to characterize rootkit exploits.  We 
assume to have the following programs: 
p1 – original set of programs 
p2 – malicious version of programs that replace p1 programs 
If p2 is a true rootkit of p1 then we can state that p1 is a subset of p2 since all of the 
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elements that exist in p1 must exist in p2.   Then p1 is a proper subset of since all 
elements of p1 exist in p2 but p1 is not equal to p2, This can be written as: 
21 pp ⊂ , since 21 pp ⊆  and 21 pp ≠  meaning p2 has at least one element that does 
not belong to p1. 
We will now identify the difference between p1 and p2. 
'1\2 ppp =  is the difference between p2 and p1 containing only those elements 
belonging to p2.  This is the ∇  that we have previously discussed. 
We assume we have identified another rootkit of p1 and call this p3.  We can identify 
this collection of programs as a rootkit of type p2 as follows: 
If 1)3'(3 pppp =∩−   then p3 contains the same elements as program p2 and is the 
same rootkit.   
If the preceding statement is not true but elements of p’ are contained in p3, written as 
3' pp ∈ , than we can assume that p3 may be a modification of rootkit p2.  If there are no 
elements of p’ in p3, written as 3' pp ∉ , than we may assume that p3 is an entirely new 
rootkit.   
A rootkit may not be a true rootkit in that it does not exact incorporate the capabilities 
of what it is intended to replace.  However, we can still use our methodology to classify 
rootkits.  We can identify the differences ( ∇ ) between the rootkit and whatever the 
rootkit is intended to replace and use this ∇  in our analysis.  This ∇  can be used to both 
detect and classify rootkit exploits. 
We will follow this framework to classify the rootkits that we are examining.  We are 




4.2 Methodology to Characterize Rootkit Exploits   
To be able to characterize rootkits with our methodology we must have a valid copy of 
the rootkit.  We will subsequently address the method (Honeynet) that we propose using 
to acquire rootkits as well as a keystroke capture of the hacker’s activity on the target 
system.  This information is available to us for analysis but at this point we assume that 
we have a copy of the rootkit that the hacker intended to install on the target system as 
well as a record of the hacker’s activity.    We also know the specific target operating 
system that was to be the intended target of this rootkit exploit.  In some cases we will 
have the source code of the rootkit which will greatly simplify our analysis.  In other 
cases we will only have the binary executable files for the rootkit exploit.  The following 
is a description of the methodology that we follow to identify the specific ∇  of a rootkit 
exploit targeting the Linux operating system.  We choose Linux as our operating system 
for this research but this methodology should apply to other UNIX type operating 
systems. 
1. Start with a clean installation of the specific kernel version of the operating 
system that was the intended target of the rootkit exploit.   
2. Install a kernel level debugger on this system.  The installation of the kernel 
level debugger will probably require the system to be recompiled with a custom 
kernel. 
3. Install and run a file integrity checker program on this system.  Select target 
directories based on an analysis of the installation that occurred when the rootkit 
was originally acquired. 
4. Install a rootkit detection program such as chkrootkit on the target system.  This 
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will help us to detect many existing system utility rootkit exploits and may help 
us to identify modification to existing as well as entirely new rootkit exploits. 
5. Install a program such as kern_check to check the integrity of the system call 
table within the kernel.    Run this program on the target system to establish a 
baseline and ensure that the kernel integrity has not been compromised on this 
initial installation.   
6. Make a copy of the kernel text segment of memory via /dev/kmem for future 
comparison.  The kernel text segment of kernel memory should remain 
consistent for a particular kernel build.   Any deviation between this copy and a 
future copy could indicate that the kernel may have been compromised by a 
kernel level rootkit exploit.    A more detailed analysis of kernel space can then 
be conducted via the kernel debugger (kdb) program that we have previously 
installed 
7. Run the file integrity checker program and the rootkit detection program on the 
target system prior to infecting the system with the rootkit to establish a baseline 
for comparison between a clean and infected system. 
8. Install the rootkit on the target system.  Follow the installation steps that were 
used from when the rootkit was initially acquired for analysis. 
9. Run the file integrity checker program on the system and note the results.  The 
presence of certain types of rootkits should be indicated by the results of the file 
integrity checker program but other types of rootkits, specifically those that 
target the kernel, may not be detected by this type of program. 
10. Run the rootkit detection program (chkrootkit) on the system that has been 
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infected with the rootkit that is being analyzed.  If this is a previously known 
system utility rootkit then a program such as chkrootkit should be able to detect 
the presence of this rootkit.  If the file integrity checker program detected a 
change to a system utility binary program file but the rootkit detection program 
did not detect the presence of a rootkit then we can assume that we are dealing 
with either a modification to an existing system utility rootkit or an entirely new 
system utility rootkit.   
11. Run the kernel integrity check program on the target system.  If the system call 
table was modified or redirected, then this program should be able to detect what 
has been modified.  Make note of each system call that is indicated as being 
modified as well as a total count of the number of system calls that have been 
modified by this rootkit. The system calls that a rootkit modifies can establish a 
signature for a specific kernel level rootkit [34].  This program may not be able 
to detect some other modification to the kernel text code segment of the kernel. 
12. Make a copy of the kernel text code and compare it against the original copy of 
the kernel text code that we prepared before infecting this system with the 
rootkit.  A difference between these two files may indicate the presence of a 
kernel level rootkit.  This is especially significant if the existing kernel integrity 
checker programs failed to detect any modification to the kernel.  This would 
indicate that we are dealing with a new type of kernel level rootkit that does not 
target the system call table.  The system call table is the normal avenue of attack 
for hackers who are attempting to create a kernel level rootkit.  
The results of these steps can be used to classify a rootkit exploit as an existing, 
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modification to an existing, or an entirely new rootkit.  The following figures show the 
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Figure 17: Flowchart of Characterization Methodology part 2 
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We will now describe each step of the methodology in detail. 
4.2.1 Clean Installation of Target Operating System 
A particular operating system must be chosen to conduct a complete analysis of a 
rootkit exploit to determine if it is existing, modification to existing, or entirely new.  
This decision can be based on a number of factors to include any available documentation 
that is available with the rootkit to include README documentation or any install 
programs (configure, Makefile).  The decision may also be based on the target of the 
initial rootkit attack.  Some rootkit exploits are successful in installing on a target 
operating system while others may not install successfully. If the rootkit was able to 
install cleanly on a target system when it was initially acquired, than that is the operating 
system that should be used to conduct the analysis.  A clean rootkit installation is 
indicated by a system that functions as normal without any indication of the underlying 
rootkit.  If the rootkit was only able to partially install or unable to install on the target 
system, then a decision must be made concerning further analysis.  Many unsophisticated 
hackers (know as ‘script kiddies’) will blindly attempt to install a particular operating 
system rootkit on any system that they are able to gain root access.  This same behavior 
can also be observed in automated Internet worm attacks.   Other rootkits may have been 
built for a particular version of a kernel and will fail to install cleanly or not install at all 
on the target system.  A decision must be made by the analyst to determine if the actual 
rootkit code is to be re-engineered to install on the target system so that the analysis 
results can be included in the methodology.  This decision can be based on any 
documentation that is available with the rootkit exploit as well as whether the rootkit was 
able to partially install on the target system.  A rootkit that was able to partially install on 
 
 52
the target system is a good candidate for re-engineering and further analysis It is 
recommended to only attempt to re-engineer the rootkit code if the initial source code for 
the rootkit is available to the analyst.   Our research is focused on rootkits targeting the 
Linux operating system.  The source code for the rootkits that we examined were written 
in the C programming language.  The ability to re-engineer rootkit source code requires 
an in-depth knowledge of C programming and a familiarity with the Linux operating 
system.   This ability has proved beneficial in our analysis of rootkit exploits by 
providing us with background information on the skill and logic of the rootkit developer.  
The following figure demonstrates in detail the process of selecting an operating system 
for analysis. 
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Figure 18: Clean Installation of Target Operating System 
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If the rootkit could not be installed on the particular system that it was originally 
targeted for, the analyst may chose to attempt to install the rootkit against some other 
operating system.   The decision can be made concerning the amount of documentation 
that is available with the rootkit.  A rootkit such as this can still be archived for future 
reference.  
4.2.2 Use of a Kernel Level Debugger 
If a kernel level debugger exists for the target operating system that has been identified 
in the previous step, then it should be installed.  A kernel level debugger will assist in 
analysis of the underlying kernel for kernel level exploits.  Certain portions of the kernel 
should be immutable for various installs of a particular operating system.  Differences 
within these portions of code may indicate that the kernel has been compromised.  The 
man page for kdb describes its capabilities as follows:  “This debugger allows the 
programmer to interactively examine kernel memory, disassemble kernel functions, set 
breakpoints in the kernel code, and display and modify register contents.” [35].   The 
features that we are interested in for conducting analysis are the md command, which 
allows for the analysis of kernel memory, and the id command, which allows for the 
disassembly of kernel functions.    
If a kernel level debugger is not available for the target system than it still may be 
possible to debug the kernel using the normal gdb debugger with kgdb.   Using kgdb 
requires the use of two computers to analyze the kernel while the use of kdb only requires 
one computer.  kdgb is described as a source level debugger while kdb is described as an 
assembly language debugger  [36].  Versions of kdgb exist for various UNIX type 
operating systems.  We did not investigate the use of kdgb in our research.  
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4.2.3 Install File Integrity checker Program 
We have already discussed the GPL file integrity checker program AIDE in a previous 
section of this thesis.  We will use this file integrity checker program to establish a 
baseline, or ‘snapshot’, of the system before the system is infected with the rootkit 
exploit[9]. 
4.2.4 Install Known Rootkit Detector Program 
The GPL chkrootkit program is also a program that we have previously described.  This 
program is useful for detecting rootkits that are already known.  We will use this program 
to identify existing rootkits as well as potential modifications to existing rootkits. 
4.2.5 Access to /dev/kmem  
The /dev/kmem file is a special file known as a device file that exists in most UNIX and 
UNIX-like operating systems to include Linux.   This device file allows a user with root 
privilege access to the kernel memory [37].  It is this capability that makes the 
/dev/kmem file a target for hackers that gain root access on a compromised system.  A 
hacker with root permission has the capability to modify the underlying kernel code. 
The /dev/kmem device file exists to provide access to the virtual memory address space 
for the current process as it is seen by the underlying kernel.   Virtual addresses within 
the kernel can be targeted for reading and/or writing with the lseek command.  The 
/dev/kmem device file on Linux supports the following commands: open, close, read,  
and write [38]. 
If the /dev/kmem file is not currently available for the target operating system then this 
system should be recompiled with /dev/kmem support.   Some system administrators 
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choose to set /dev/kmem to read-only to secure their system.  However, there is a 
workaround to this that would allow a hacker to modify the kernel via /dev/kmem even if 
write access is not available for /dev/kmem [39]. 
4.2.6 Copy kernel text segment via /dev/kmem 
The immutable kernel code, known as kernel text, is loaded into kernel memory and is 
accessible via /dev/kmem.  As previously explained, this code should remain consistent 
across the same kernel version of a particular operating system unless that version of the 
operating system is patched and recompiled.   The following figure shows how this 
kernel code is stored in kernel memory. 
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Figure 19: first 512 page frames of first two megabytes of kernel memory [40] 
 
We are concerned with the section of code between the _text and _etext identifiers in 
the above figure.  The first byte of kernel code is designated by the _text symbol and the 
end of the kernel code is indicated by the _etext symbol.  Initialized and uninitialized 
kernel data follows in the remaining two segments.  The symbols in the above figure are 
produced upon compilation of the kernel and written to the System.map file.  We can 
retrieve the addresses of the _text and _etext symbol from this file.    We can then use 
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these addresses to make a copy of the original kernel text region of memory to establish a 
baseline for future analysis.  This technique is similar to that of the GPL StMichael 
program that we have previously discussed in Section 3 of this paper. As a loadable 
kernel module (lkm), StMichael makes a copy of this segment of kernel code within the 
kernel and conducts a periodic examination of this archived copy of the kernel code 
against the currently installed kernel code.  However, StMichael modifies this section of 
kernel code and is in essence a kernel level rootkit.  Our method makes a copy of the 
kernel code we wish to use as a baseline and stores this data within userspace.  Once a 
copy of this code is produced, it can be copied to read-only media for follow-on analysis. 
4.2.7 Establish Baseline on system prior to infection with rootkit 
This is the point where a clean baseline for the target system can be established prior to 
infecting the system with a rootkit.  All of the necessary tools have been installed on the 
system and the results of a baseline establishment should be that of a clean, uninfected 
system.   The baseline of the file integrity checker program is used subsequently to detect 
evidence of system utility rootkit infection on the target system.  The resulting database 
that is produced by the file integrity checker program should be archived to a read-only 
media for follow-on analysis once the system is subsequently infected by a rootkit.    In 
addition, the binary system utilities that are used by the file integrity checker program 
should also be copied to the read-only media for use during the follow-on analysis.  This 
procedure is recommended in general by the developers of the GPL chkrootkit known 
rootkit detection program [3].   
The selection of directories to use in establishing a baseline on the target system should 
be based on any documentation that is available from the rootkit.  This documentation 
 
 57
can be used to determine what system utilities the rootkit may target for replacements.  
As a default, the /bin, /usr/bin, and /sbin directories should be selected since many 
potential system utilities that are targeted by hackers reside in these directories. 
The known rootkit detection program should also be run against the target system at this 
point.  This check should not show any indication of rootkit exploit of the target system 
since we are starting with a clean system that has not yet been infected with a rootkit.  If 
the presence of a rootkit is detected, both the target system and the rootkit detection 
program should be investigated prior to proceeding further in analysis.  This could be an 
indication of a faulty install of the operating system or a mismatch between the operating 
system and the chkrootkit detection program.  Figure 20 demonstrates the steps necessary 
for establishing a baseline for the target system prior to rootkit infection. 
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Figure 20: Baseline Establishment 
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4.2.8 Install rootkit on target system 
At this point a rootkit that is able to cleanly (or partially) install on the target system is 
available.  The installation should occur as per any install documentation that was 
provided with the rootkit (configure and Makefile) or as per any other install script that 
was used by the hacker when the initial system was compromised.  An original record of 
the system compromise was already collected from the Honeynet, even if the hacker 
deleted any trace of the rootkit installation on the target system. 
4.2.9 Run file integrity checker  
The file integrity checker should now be run on the target system after the installation 
of the rootkit.    Any changes that are detected are to be documented for further analysis.  
It is significant to note that certain rootkits may only change attributes to certain files and 
directories without changing the underlying files and directories.  This will result in the 
file integrity checker program indicating that these files and directories have been 
changed.  Our analysis indicates that a rootkit developer may choose to change the 
underlying attributes to a file or a directory to prevent the changes that they have made to 
the target system from being undone.  It is possible to set the attributes of a file so that 
these files can not be subsequently modified or deleted (making these file unchangeable 
(-i bit) or undeletable (-u bit)), even by a user with root or administrator privilege.   
Figure 8 of section 3.1 displays an example of this.  The can be accomplished with the 
change attributes on file system (chattr) system utility command.  A system administrator 
can reset the permission on any files modified by the rootkit with the chattr command.  
However, the hacker may have modified this command with the rootkit so that it will no 
longer function correctly on the files that have been modified.  The chattr and list 
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attributes on file system (lsattr) are two system utilities that should be archived from the 
clean system installation for future use as discussed in section 4.2.7.   The following 
figures demonstrates the process of running the file integrity checker on the target system 






























Figure 21: File Integrity Check Procedures 
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Any files that are identified as having been modified are candidates for follow-on 
analysis to identify a ∇  (delta) for reference.  This ∇  can be compared against previous 
∇ ’s from already known rootkits to determine if this rootkit is existing, modification to 
existing, or entirely new.   We will present our classification methods in a subsequent 
section of this document. 
Files and directories that had their attributes changed by the chattr command but which 
were otherwise unmodified can have their attributes reset using a clean copy of the chattr 
system utility command.  Documentation of hacker install scripts can be analyzed for use 
of this command in the installation of the rootkit or these files can be analyzed prior to 
rootkit installation to determine the original attributes to these files. This may be 
necessary to allow for follow-on analysis on the target system. 
4.2.10 Run Known Rootkit Detection Program 
The known rootkit detection program ‘chkrootkit’ should now be run on the target 
system.  Most previously known rootkits, as well as modifications to previously known 
rootkits that maintain many of the same characteristics as the original rootkit exploit 
should be detected by this program.   The chkrootkit program may indicate that the 
system is infected by a particular rootkit when in fact the system is infected by some 
entirely new rootkit that shares the same characteristic signature as the original rootkit.  
This signature has been previously identified and incorporated into the chkrootkit 
program.   
The chkrootkit program may also indicate some suspicious activity on the target system 
that it is unable to classify as a particular rootkit exploit.  This may be the case 
concerning kernel level rootkits.  Figure 9 of section 3.1 is an example of this.  A 
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mismatch was detected between the /proc directory and the report process status (ps) 
command by the chkrootkit program.  This is an indication the kernel has most likely 
been compromised.    The chkrootkit program will also detect that certain ports on the 
system are associated with possible trojan programs.  The following figures demonstrates 
the process of conducting known rootkit detection analysis on the target system after it 
has been infected with the rootkit exploit. 
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Figure 22: Known rootkit detection analysis 
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The results of this step in the analysis process are used in follow-on analysis to 
determine if the rootkit being examined is existing or modification to existing.  Entirely 
new rootkits will normally not be detected by this step in the analysis unless they share 
attributes that are similar to existing rootkits.  Suspicious kernel activity that is detected 
by the chkrootkit program is noted for further analysis at the point where the kernel 
integrity is checked.  
4.2.11 Previously known rootkit identification 
In our analysis we conducted a comparison using the results of the previous step (run 
known rootkit detection program) against the results of the file integrity checker program.  
The files that a previously known rootkit modifies should already be published.  If this is 
the case and we are dealing with a previously known rootkit, the files that are detected as 
modified by the file integrity checker program should be the files that are detected as 
being modified by the known rootkit detection program.  Any deviation from this may 
indicate that we are dealing with a modification to an existing rootkit. 
A modification to an existing rootkit may change additional files besides those that are 
changed by the original rootkit.  This is indicated by files that are detected as being 
changed by the file integrity checker program but not detected by the known rootkit 
detection program.   A modification to an existing rootkit may change the same files as 
the original rootkit in a new manner, resulting in these modified files no longer being 
detected by the known rootkit detection program.    At this point an in-depth analysis of 
the files indicated as being changed by the file integrity checker program but not detected 
by the known rootkit detection program should occur to identify ∇  characteristics for 
incorporation in subsequent versions of the known rootkit detection  algorithm.  It is 
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significant to note that rootkit modifications of the kernel will most likely not be detected 
by this analysis.  Kernel analysis for rootkit exploitation is addressed in a subsequent 
section.  The following figures demonstrates the comparison that must occur to determine 
if we are dealing with an existing rootkit or a modification to an existing rootkit.  
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Figure 23: Previously known rootkit identification 
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4.2.12 Verify Integrity of the Kernel 
The system should now be analyzed to detect if the rootkit has made any modifications 
to the kernel.  As previously discussed in section 2.4, current kernel rootkits target the 
System Calls.    Unix type systems implement most interfaces between user mode 
processes and the underlying hardware devices that the user mode process needs to 
access with system calls.  The system calls are issued to the kernel by the user mode 
process [41].  The ability of compromised system calls to provide erroneous information 
to user mode processes makes system calls a target of rootkit developers.  As previously 
mentioned, kernel rootkits are difficult to detect using conventional detections methods. 
Our methodology initially focuses on analysis of the system calls to determine if the 
kernel has been modified by a rootkit.  The first step is to verify the integrity of the 
System Call table within the kernel.    The system call table within the kernel must be 
checked for modifications to system call addresses as well as being checked to see if a 
redirection of the system call table is occurring within kernel memory.  Redirection of the 
system call table results in a new system call table being created in user space with a 
corresponding new address.   All subsequent references to the system call table are 
directed to this new corrupted system call table while the original system call table 
remains intact.  Analysis of the system call table to detect modification to system call 
addresses can be conducted by comparing the addresses of the system calls listed in the 
/boot/System.map file with the addresses of the system calls in the system call table 
(sys_call_table).  This analysis can be done using the kdb kernel debugger program as 
well as with the GPL tool kern_check described in section 3.1.  This type of compromise 
can be easily detected if the proper areas of kernel memory are examined.  The area of 
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kernel memory to check for this type of exploit is the sys_call_table.  The address of the 
sys_call_table within kernel space is available within the System.map file once the 
system is compiled.  This address will remain consistent for all of the same versions of 
kernel code. 
To detect the presence of a rootkit that redirects the sys_call_table other areas of the 
kernel space must be examined.  A kernel level rootkit may overwrite the location in 
kernel memory that contains the address of the system call table.    The kernel level 
rootkit is able to accomplish this by querying a specific register within the processor.   It 
then uses this information to find the entry point address within the kernel for the system 
call table and overwrites this address with the address of a new system call table 
containing the addresses of some malicious system calls that the rootkit also creates.  We 
present an in depth analysis of how a particular rootkit accomplishes this within an 
appendix of this  thesis.    
To detect a rootkit of this type a methodology similar to what the hacker used must be 
followed.  Our detection method queries the same register that is targeted by the rootkit 
described above.  Using this information we are able to retrieve the address of the system 
call table that is currently in use on the target system.  The addresses of the system calls 
that are currently in use on the target system can then be compared against the addresses 
of the system calls in the /boot/System.map file in a manner similar to that described 
above to detect the presence of a kernel level rootkit that modifies system calls.    A 
mismatch between the address of the system calls from the /boot/System.map file and the 
addresses that are listed within the current sys_call_table from kernel memory may be an 
indication that the kernel has been compromised by a rootkit that targets system calls.  It 
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is significant to note however, that the version of the System.map file used for 
comparison must correspond to the current kernel installation on the target system.  A 
new System.map file is created whenever the kernel is recompiled.  Using an outdated 
System.map file will most likely result in mismatch with the sys_call_table that is 
resident within kernel memory.    
Analysis may reveal that the system calls have not been modified. The rest of the kernel 
code segment should be analyzed for possible exploitation by a kernel level rootkit.  This 
can be accomplished by comparing the current segment of kernel code that resides within 
kernel space against the version of the kernel code that we archived for analysis.  Kernel 
code was archived for analysis when we established a baseline for this system prior to 
infecting the system with the rootkit. A difference between these two files will indicate 
that some other area of the kernel may have been targeted for exploitation by the rootkit.  
A GPL program such as chkidt, described in section 3.1, can be used to check the 
integrity of the Interrupt Descriptor Table.  A comparison of the currently running kernel 
can also be accomplished by kdb to disassemble addresses where the particular 
differences occur.     
If  this analysis indicates that no modifications to the system calls have occurred and the 
current segment of kernel code matches the baseline segment of kernel code than we 
assume that the kernel has not been modified by this rootkit.   Analysis can focus on the 
system level utilities that have been detected as being modified.   Segments of the kernel 
that may have been modified must undergo further analysis to identify a possible ∇  for 
classification.  It is significant to note that a rootkit may contain elements that modify 
both the kernel and system utilities on the target system. 
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  The following figure shows the steps that must be taken to verify the integrity of the 


























Figure 24: Verify kernel 
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4.2.13 Analyze results of Kernel Integrity Check 
The kernel integrity checker program kern_check will detect modifications to the 
system call table.  This is an indication that the corresponding system calls within kernel 
space have been modified by the rootkit.   The kern_check program will output those 
system call addresses currently listed in the active sys_call_table that do not match the 
system call addresses listed in the System.map file.  If the current System.map file is up 
to date with the current kernel, then the system_call_table has been modified by a kernel 
rootkit.  Methods to intercept  system calls have been published and are available on the 
Internet [42].   
A program such as StMichael, discussed in section 3.2, would be detected in this 
manner since it is installed via a loadable kernel module and changes four system calls 
along with their underlying addresses.  Any system call can be redirected by a loadable 
kernel module in the current versions of the Linux kernel.  Since we are initially starting 
with a clean operating system install any loadable kernel  module installations are 
unexpected and suspicious in nature.  System calls can also be modified via /dev/kmem.   
These are the areas that are to be analyzed for identifying potential ∇ ’s for follow-on 
characterization.   
Many of the kernel rootkits that have been analyzed thus far that target system calls 
make use of the original system calls which are renamed.  This is done to maintain the 
functionality of the original system calls which is to be incorporated into the modified 
system call [42].  Kernel rootkit syscalls wrap the original system call address within 
their exploit code.     
It may be possible to identify a particular kernel rootkit by documenting the particular 
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system calls that the rootkit modifies [34].  These modified system calls can be detected 
by the above analysis.  Two separate kernel rootkits that modify the same set of system 
calls may require more detailed analysis.  One of these rootkits may just be a 
modification of the other rootkit.  
































Figure 25: Kernel Integrity Check Analysis 
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4.2.14 Compare current kernel text code against baseline 
A kernel rootkit may attempt to overwrite the valid address space of the system call 
with modified system call code while maintaining the original system call functionality.  
Theoretically, it may be possible to move the original system call address space to some 
other portion of kernel memory and access it from the original address.  This would still 
be detectable from the baseline kernel code comparison.  However, we have not 
examined any kernel rootkits that follow this methodology in conducting this research.   
Any changes to the kernel not detected by previous analysis should be detected by 
comparison of the kernel text code that currently resides in memory with the baseline 
kernel text code that was previously established.   
At this point a comparison must be made between the results of the kernel integrity 
check and the kernel text code comparison.  The system calls that are detected as being 
modified by the kernel integrity check program should also be detected as being modified 
by the kernel text code comparison.  If there are no additional modifications to the kernel 
text code then the rootkit is most likely a previously known rootkit.  Additional 
modifications to the kernel text code that were not detected by the kernel integrity check 
are indications that the rootkit under analysis is either a modification to an existing kernel 
level rootkit or an entirely new kernel level rootkit.    
The kernel code segment for the potential modification to an existing rootkit or entirely 
new rootkit is to be analyzed to classify this rootkit.   The kdb kernel debugger can be 
used to analyze the segments of kernel text code that are indicated as having been 
modified as a result of the comparison with the original kernel text code segment from 
the baseline that was previously established.  The md and id commands can be used to 
 
 71
examine the kernel memory as well as to disassemble segments of kernel code for follow 
on analysis.   The following figures shows the analysis that is performed on comparing 
the results of the kern integrity check against the kernel text comparison to determine if 


































We have proposed a methodology for the detection and classification of rootkit exploits 
as either existing, modification to existing, or entirely new.  This framework seeks to 
identify a delta ( ∇ ) within the rootkit exploit that is to be used in the classification 
process. 
A methodology was then proposed to identify data to use for classifying rootkit 
exploits.  We presented steps that were to be taken during the classification process.  We 
made use of current GPL detection methodology during this analysis and conduct manual 
analysis when necessary.   Application of this methodology to a compromised system 
result in the identification of the specific elements of the compromised system that are to 




New Methods to Detect and Classify Rootkit Exploits 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe methods that can be used to detect and 
classify certain types of rootkit exploits.  We have already presented a formal 
methodology to classify rootkit exploits as existing, modification to existing or entirely 
new in the previous chapter.  A key component of our methodology is the ability to 
identify a delta ( ∇ ) within the rootkit exploit.  This  ∇  is some identifiable characteristic 
between the rootkit and the underlying program or capability that the rootkit is intended 
to replace on the target system. The formal methodology to classify rootkit exploits will 
indicate potential areas for further analysis to  identify a ∇  that can be used for both 
classification and follow-on detection of the rootkit.   We propose methods that can be 
used to identify this ∇  characteristic.  These methods will address rootkits that replace 
system utilities as well as those that target the underlying kernel of the target operating 
system.  We also present  changes that were made to the chkrootkit program as a result of 
our methodology. 
The vulnerabilities that exist in modern operating systems as well the proliferation of 
exploits that allow hackers to gain root access on networked computer systems provide 
hackers with the ability to install rootkits on systems once root access has been acquired   
System administrators need to be aware of the threats that their computers face from 
rootkits as well as the ability to recognize if a rootkit has been installed on their computer 
system.     
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5.1  Detection of Unique String Signatures in Binary System Utility 
Exploits 
We propose a methodology to uniquely identify the different rootkits that target binary 
system utility programs for replacement.   The Linux Rootkit IV (lrk4) developed by 
Lord Somer is an example of this type of rootkit.   To accomplish this we will make use 
of the print lines matching a pattern (fgrep) utility that is available on the target system.  
It is best to use a version of fgrep  that was archived from the target system prior to that 
system being infected with the rootkit to ensure that the version of fgrep that is in use was 
not a target of the rootkit.  It is necessary to have a clean copy of each binary file that was 
replaced by the rootkit program.  The listing of the files that were replaced would be 
available as a result of running AIDE on the target system as discussed in the formal 
methodology.   Copies of the infected binary files are available on the target system.  For 
example, on a target Red Hat 6.2 system running the Linux 2.2 kernel, the login program 
is one of the program files that is indicated as having been changed by the AIDE program 
after the lrk4 rootkit was run on this system.  A clean login binary exists in the bin_bu 
directory, which was created when the operating system was first installed based on the 
documentation that was available with the lrk4 rootkit.  The lrk4 documentation indicates 
that the various system utilities maintained in the /bin directories are targets for 
replacement by the lrk4 rootkit.  Results from the program AIDE indicates the login 
program in the /bin directory is infected by lrk4 indicated by the AIDE program.  The 
methodology to identify unique ∇  characteristics is as follows: 
1. Run the strings command on each file in question and pipe the results into a file 
for further comparison. 
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2. As an additional check run the diff  command against these two files for a check 
to see if the strings contained in the two files are different.  Use the –q switch so 
that the output only reflects if the files are different. 
3. Run the following command:  fgrep –v –f  login.clean login.infected 
   The fgrep command outputs a line-matching pattern.            
The -v  switch  is an invert-matching switch which tells the fgrep function to only 
output those lines that do not match.  The –f switch tells the fgrep command to get the 
patterns to use for matching in the second file (login.infected) from the first file 
(login.clean).  Figure 27 shows this series of commands being executed. 
 
 
Figure 27:  commands to compare login files 
 
This series of commands compares the strings that exists in both files and outputs only 
those existing strings that are different between the two files.  Using the clean login file 
as the string source and the infected login file as the target file will result in the output of 
those strings that exist in the hacked version of the login program but do not exist in the 
clean login file.    The output of this command is displayed in the Figure 28 with the 





Figure 28: Output of fgrep function 
 
There are numerous strings that differ between the clean and hacked login file.    The 
primary reason for this is that analysis of the lrk4 source code which was available 
showed that the lrk4 login program is based on the Shadow-Suite login.c code and the 
clean login program is based on the BSD login.c code.  However, some of these strings 
are potential ∇  characteristics that can be used to detect and classify this rootkit. These 
∇  characteristics can be used as signatures for the chkrootkit program to use to check for 
the existence of an infected login program.  The fact that we had the clean login.c code 
from the Shadow-Suite made it easy to determine what code, to include what strings, had 
been added by Lord Somer.  All that is then required is to check these added strings 
against the original clean login.c binary file to ascertain the validity of using these ∇  
characteristic strings as a signature. 
By using our methodology a system administrator could build a library of files that may 
contain the text strings that exist  in the system binaries.  Even if these files do not 
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contain any unique strings they can still serve as a unique signature for a specific rootkit.  
As various rootkits are discovered additional unique binary files can be added to the 
library.  A system administrator that determined that a binary system utility rootkit had 
been installed on a system could follow our methodology to compare the infected system 
binaries with the files that exist in the library.     
Thus, if an infected binary did not match with the existing binaries in the library, the 
system administrator could make the determination that the system has been infected with 
a new or modified rootkit since it does not match any of the existing signature files.     
The text strings that exist in this new or modified rootkit can be examined for unique 
strings to identify this new trojan  exploit.  This unique ∇  characteristic string could be 
used by the chkrootkit program to identify this specific rootkit exploit.  A common ∇  
characteristic text string could also be sought so that the chkrootkit program would be 
able to detect the greatest number of exploits with the least number of signatures.  In 
either case, this ∇  characteristic signature can also be provided to a signature–based IDS 
system  for detection of this exploit. 
5.2 Modifications to the chkrootkit program 
We initially installed the Lord Somer’s lrk4 rootkit on a clean Red Hat 6.2 system.  We 
then ran chkrootkit-0.36, which was the current available version of chkrootkit, against 
the system.  This version of chkrootkit detected that some of the binaries had been 
infected, but it did not detect that the login binary had been infected.  The lrk4 rootkit that 
we installed did contain a source login.c program with a trojan capability as previously 
discussed in the last section.  
Upon analysis, we discovered an error in the logic of the chkrootkit program.  The 
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chkrootkit suite is a script called chkrootkit that calls a routine called chk_login.  This 
routine performs signature analysis on the login program by looking for the appearance 
of various strings within the binary file.  One of the strings used by the chkrootkit 
program to detect infected login programs is the string “root”.  The lrk4 login binary file 
has 2 instances of the string “root” within it.  The clean login program does not contain 
any reference to the string ‘root’.   The chk_login routine was written to allow for the 
appearance of  2 or less instances of “root” in the login binary program.   We contacted  
Nelson Murilo, who is one of the authors of the chkrootkit program, about our discovery 
and provided him with the results of our analysis.    The chkrootkit code was modified to 
only allow for the appearance of the string “root” in the login file for those specific 
operating systems that have the string “root” appear in the clean version of their login 
files.  A new version of the chkrootkit program, chkrootkit-0.37,  was quickly released 
that detected that the lrk4 login file is infected.   
5.3 Detection of Unique String Signatures in Binary System Utility 
Exploits using String Hiding Techniques 
A rootkit developer may choose to use string hiding techniques to defeat the signature 
analysis checks for rootkit exploits.    It may be possible for the developer of a rootkit 
exploit to create a binary trojan file without any distinct differences in the string 
signatures between the trojan file and the original good binary file.  One method to 
accomplish this is to use a character array with the rootkit source code to store string 
values.  If the developer were to use a character array to hide the trojan password in the 
file than it may not be possible to detect the trojan password with the strings command.  
The normal method to write character strings into an array is as follows: strcpy (rewt, 
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“rewt”).  This would result in the string rewt being visible within the compiled program.  
Usernames, passwords, or any other text string written individually into an array will 
only appear in the binary files as a sequence of single characters separated by instructions 
as opposed to a sequence of adjacent characters.  According to the MAN page for the 
strings command, the default search setting is to search for text strings of at least 4 
characters in length.   This value can be reset to a smaller value.  However, if a character 
array is used and individual characters that are written into an array one character at a 
time then the results would be different at compile time.  Each individual character would 
most likely be surrounded by OPCODE instructions and memory and register locations.   
The binary executable program that is generated by the compile would not have any 
string values within it.  This binary executable is examined by the chkrootkit program for 
specific string signature values.  
Running the file integrity check on a system with an installed rootkit may indicate that 
one or more of the system utility binary files has been altered.  The chkrootkit program, 
which is primarily string signature based, may not detect this rootkit installation if string 
hiding techniques are being utilized. Conducting an analysis of these binary utility files 
with the methods we have previously discussed for detecting unique string signatures 
may not result in the identification of any unique signatures in the modified files.  Text 
strings that are necessary for proper rootkit execution may be hidden with string hiding 
techniques within  the rootkit program.   
We recognized that a method needed to be developed for identifying rootkit text strings 
hidden in character arrays within binary files.   We present an examination of the binary 
code of a trojan login module as a case study to identify string hiding techniques that may 
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be used by hackers in the development of trojan login programs.   The login program is a 
logical choice for string hiding techniques to hide the trojan password or the trojan 
username and password combination.  Lord Somer, in lrk4, makes a reference to the use 
of string hiding techniques in the rootkit.h file, which is the header file for the lrk4 rootkit 
exploit.    The fact that Lord Somer references string hiding techniques indicates that this 
technique may be in use by some hackers in the development of rootkit exploits.   Text 
strings that are hidden in this manner may be used to characterize and identify specific 
rootkits if these text strings can be identified and extracted from the trojan binary code if 
the rootkit source code is not available.   If the source code is available then we can look 
for strings written into character arrays.   
When we began analyzing binary files for hidden strings we recognized that we needed 
some type of program that is capable of viewing these types of files.  The program that 
we chose to utilize is BIEW.  This GPL program is described as follows: “BIEW (Binary 
vIEW) is a free, portable, advanced file viewer with built-in editor for binary, 
hexadecimal and disassembler modes” [43].  This is in keeping with our goal to use open 
source tools to conduct our analysis. 
Analysis of the lrk4 source code for the login program indicated that the term ‘rewt’ 
was stored within a character array called rewt.  The name “rewt” is the hacker’s 
modification on the word root.  If the source code is available for a rootkit, efforts to use 
string hiding techniques can be identified by conducting an in-depth analysis of this 
source code.  Any character arrays within the source code can be examined to determine 
their use within the rootkit program.  A check can be made against the original source 
code that the rootkit is intended to replace to see if this same character array exists.  If 
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this character array does not appear in the original source code and the string value that it 
contains is used in a comparison with some value that is input by a user then this array 
and its associated value would be suspicious in nature.  The following figure shows an 
example screen display of this type of character array that was found in the lrk4 login 
source code.  This character array does not appear in the original login source code. 
 
 
Figure 29: rewt array used for sting hiding 
 
The name “rewt” is the hacker’s modification on the word root.  If the source code is 
available for rootkit efforts to use string hiding techniques can be identified by 
conducting an in-depth analysis of this source code.  However, the source code for the 
rootkit exploit may not always be available.  We set out to find a methodology to detect 
text strings hidden within character arrays for systems utilizing the Intel i386 
architecture, which is the common platform of choice for running the Linux operating 
system.    This methodology may be transferable to other architectures and can be 
modified to identify other array types. 
Both the source and binary code for the clean and hacked version of the login routine 
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are available for examination.   Running the find differences between two files (diff) 
command on the two source files outputs the differences between the files.  The first 
noticeable difference is that an integer variable ‘elite’ and a five-character array “rewt” 
are introduced into the login.c program.  We speculate that the name “rewt” is the 
hacker’s modification on the word root.  A common hacker signature is 31337.  31337 
spells out “eleet” in the dialogue used by some hackers [44].   We believe that the “elite” 
variable is the hacker’s modification of eleet.  This integer value is initially set equal to 
zero.   The five-character array rewt stores the name “rewt” and a terminating null 
symbol.    
We then searched the binary source file for the name rewt to determine if we could find 
a way to recognize this term.  We conducted a manual analysis of this file by searching 
for the individual characters ‘r’, ‘e’, ‘w’, and ‘t’ in sequence within the binary file using 
the bmove program within the BIEW tool set.  This tool set is available on the web at:  
http://sourceforge.net/projects/biew.    The following screen shows where we found the 
term ‘rewt’ within the binary lrk4 login program.   The characters  ‘r’ (ASCII value 72 
hex), ‘e’  (ASCII value 65 hex), ‘w’ (ASCII value 77 hex), and ‘t’ ( ASCII value 74 hex) 
appear starting at the second line of the display. 
 
 
Figure 30: string 'rewt' written into character array 
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Each of the four ASCII characters is in a sequence of seven bytes with the last byte 
being the value of the ASCII character that is to be written into the character array.  The 
first byte in each seven byte series is the opcode ‘C6’.   Since our research involves the 
Linux operating system running on Intel x86 Pentium processors, we went to the Intel 
Embedded Pentium Processor Family Technical Information Center at 
http://www.intel.com/design/intarch/techinfo/pentium.   According to the opcode map 
available at this site, the ‘C6’ opcode corresponds to the MOV mnemonic [45].  A 
separate description of the MOV command is also available at this site.  This command is 
described as follows:  Move immediate one byte value (the ASCII character) to a one 
byte register/memory location.  This is the exact behavior that we would expect for a 
command to store a single character from a string into a character array.   
It may also be possible to identify strings being written into a character array by 
disassembling the binary file since both disassembly and analysis by the BIEW program 
provide a one to one mapping of the hex code within the binary file.  The BIEW program 
does provide you with printable character output which makes it easier to search for the 
particular characters that compose the string. 
Now that we have a particular mnemonic command (MOV) and opcode associated with 
this particular string hiding technique.  We can then use this information to search binary 
files for instances of strings being hidden into character arrays.  A search can be 
conducted for all consecutive instances of the C6 opcode command separated by a 
consistent number of bytes capturing the last byte.  This last byte is the ASCII character 
that is being written into a character array.    All of the individual bytes collected from a 
consecutive series of C6 opcodes can be concatenated together to form a string.  
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Characteristics of this string (e.g. length) can be used as a signature for this rootkit 
exploit.  This same methodology could also be followed to identify data that is to be 
written within other types of data structures. 
5.4 Detection of Kernel Rootkit Exploits by Examination of System Call 
Table Entry Point in the Kernel 
Checking the System Call Table in kernel memory against the /boot/System.map file 
has already been proposed.  This is the technique that the Samhain program kern_check 
utilizes to detect for instances of kernel level rootkits.  However, the original kern_check 
program fails to detect rootkits of the System Call Table redirection variety as well as to 
detect any type of rootkits on more recent versions of the Linux kernel.     
Our examination of the SuckIT rootkit which is a rootkit the redirects the system call 
table, revealed to us the first difference, or ∇  in functionality between SuckIT and the 
program that it replaces.  SuckIT overwrites a location in kernel memory that contains the 
address of the system call table.    SuckIT is able to accomplish this by querying a 
specific register within the processor.   It then use this information to find the entry point 
address within the kernel for the system call table and overwrites this address with the 
address of a new system call table containing the addresses of some malicious system 
calls that SuckIT also creates.  We present an in-depth analysis of how SuckIT 
accomplishes this within the appendix of this thesis.    
We now have a ∇  consisting of a redirected system call table address, a new system 
call table, and some new malicious system calls.  We propose that you can use the same 
method that SuckIT uses to query the processor to retrieve the address of the system call 
table to check and see if this address has been changed by a rootkit such as SuckIT.  The 
 
 85
original address is available when the kernel is first compiled and this address is stored in 
the /boot/System.map file.  If these addresses differ then a more detailed check can be 
made of the system call table  that currently exists in kernel memory to develop a ∇  
between the addresses of the system calls that exist in system call table within kernel 
memory and the addresses of the system calls that exist in the /boot/System.map file.   
If the /boot/System.map file is current then differences between  it and the system call 
table within kernel memory will indicate that redirection of the system calls is occurring 
on the system  and that the system is infected with some type of rootkit.  A preliminary 
signature can be established based on the number of system calls that are being redirected 
on the target system.  If two different kernel level rootkits change a different number of 
system calls then we can assume we have two different kernel level rootkits.  If these two 
rootkits change the same system calls then we can conduct are more detailed analysis of 
each infected system to look for differences between the two rootkits.   
This method will also work in the detection of kernel rootkits that modify the existing 
system call table in the more recent versions of the Linux operating system.  We are now 
able to query the system for the address of the system call table that is currently in use by 
the kernel.   This system call table can then be analyzed for exploitation.  
If we do not have the rootkit source code available we can still look for differences 
though either the kdb program or we can copy segments of kernel memory through 
/dev/kmem and examining this data off-line.  We can use kdb to examine the actual 
machine code of the malicious system calls since we will have the actual addresses of 
these malicious system calls within kernel memory.  We can also try and disassemble 
these malicious system calls manually or through the kdb program if it is installed on the 
 
 86
system that we are using to investigate this kernel level rootkit.   
In any case, we are now able to detect that redirection of the system call table is 
occurring on the target system.  We do realize that a hacker may be able to develop a 
kernel level rootkit that could provide false information concerning the entry point of the 
system call table within the kernel.   At present, however, we are unaware of any kernel 
level rootkit that is able to do this. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have proposed some methods for identifying a specific a delta ( ∇ ) 
characteristic within the rootkit exploit that is to be used in the detection and 
classification process.   Examination of an existing rootkit should result in a ∇  that is 
already known and examination of a modification to an existing rootkit should result in a 
∇  that is similar to the ∇  for an already known rootkit.  An entirely new rootkit exploit 
should result is a ∇  that has characteristics that has never been seen in a previously 
examined rootkit exploit. 
 Our analysis involved rootkits that replace system utilities as well as those that target 
the underlying kernel of the target operating system.  The methods that we presented in 
this chapter will allow a researcher to identify  a specific ∇  for the rootkit that is being 




Establishment of a Honeynet to Detect New Rootkit Exploits 
We have previous expressed that a key component of our methodology is that we 
require a copy of the rootkit that we wish to detect and characterize.  The method that we 
propose to use to be able to do this is to use a Honeynet.  An added benefit to using a 
Honeynet to collect research data is that the Honeynet can improve the overall security of 
the network where it is employed [46].  We believe the use of a Honeynet within a 
network can provide additional network security.  The Honeynet can serve as a 
compliment to the use of the firewall and IDS and help to overcome some of the 
shortcomings that are inherent to these systems.  The Honeynet will also allow for the 
collection of any rootkits  that are targeted against any systems on the Honeynet. 
6.1 Definition of a Honeynet 
A Honeynet is a network, placed behind a reverse firewall that captures all inbound and 
outbound data.  The reverse firewall limits the amount of malicious traffic that can leave 
the Honeynet.  This data is contained, captured, and controlled.  Any type of system can 
be placed within the Honeynet, to include those systems that are currently employed on 
the network that the Honeynet is intended to protect.   Standard production systems can 
be used on the Honeynet to give the hacker the look and feel of a real system.   A 
Honeynet is a network intended to be compromised so as to provide the system 




There are two critical principles concerning the successful operation of a Honeynet.  
These two principles are the concept of Data Capture and Data Control.  Both of these 
principles must be followed for the Honeynet to be successfully employed. 
The principle of Data Capture concerns information gathering.  All information that 
enters or leaves the Honeynet must be collected for analysis.  This data must be collected 
without the knowledge of the individuals who are conducting malicious activity against 
the network that is to be protected.  This is to prevent the hacker from bypassing the 
Honeynet network.  The data that is collected must be stored in a location different from 
the Honeynet.  This is done so that if the hacker compromises a Honeynet system, the 
data cannot be destroyed or altered.  The goal is to be able to capture data on the hacker 
without the hacker knowing that this data is being collected. 
The principle of Data Control concerns protecting other networks from being attacked 
and compromised by computers on the Honeynet.  If a hacker compromises a Honeynet 
system, then this hacker must be prevented from using this system to attack and 
compromise production systems on other networks.  The process of Data Control must be 
automated to prevent the hacker from getting suspicious.  We do not want the hacker to 
become aware of the fact that the system compromised is on a Honeynet  [48]. 
6.2 Honeynet Establishment 
There are currently two types of Honeynets that can be employed on a network.  These 
are GEN I, or first generation, and GEN II, or second generation.  The type of Honeynet 
that one chooses to use depends on many factors to include availability of resources, 





GEN I Honeynets are the simpler methodology to employ.   This technology was first 
developed in 1999 by the Honeynet Alliance.  Although GEN I Honeynets are somewhat 
limited in their ability for Data Capture and Data Control, they are highly effective in 
detecting automated attacks or beginner level attacks against targets of opportunity on the 
network.  Their limitations in Data Control make it possible for a hacker to fingerprint 
them as a Honeynet.  They also offer little to a skilled hacker to attract them to target the 
Honeynet, since the machines on the Honeynet are normally just default installations of 
various operating systems. 
GEN II Honeynets were developed in 2002 to address the shortcomings inherent with 
GEN I Honeynets.  The primary area that was addressed by GEN II Honeynets is in the 
area of Data Control.  GEN I Honeynets used a firewall to provide Data Control by 
limiting the number of outbound connections from the Honeynet.  This is a very effective 
method of Data Control, however, it lacks flexibility and allows for the possibility of the 
hacker fingerprinting the Honeynet.   GEN II Honeynets provide data control by 
examining outbound data and making a determination to block, to pass, or to modify by 
changing some of the packet contents so as to allow data to appear to pass but rendering 
it benign.  GEN II Honeynets are more complex to deploy and maintain than GEN I 
Honeynets [49]. 
We had chosen to initially deploy a GEN I Honeynet on our enterprise network.   We 
were concerned with detecting machines within our enterprise network that had been 
compromised by automated script type attacks in addition to collecting rootkit research.   
We later employed a GEN II Honeynet in our research efforts. 
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The Georgia Tech Honeynet was initially established during the Summer of 2002.  It 
was established using open source software and with equipment that is not currently state 
of the art.  Initially, it was established as a single computer but was expanded to include 
several different machines running various operating systems.    The following diagram 
(Figure 31) shows a typical configuration of the GEN II Georgia Tech Honeynet. 
 
 
Figure 31: The Georgia Tech Honeynet 
 
An IP address range was provided to us by the Georgia Tech Office of Information 
Technology (OIT) to establish this Honeynet.  This block of addresses is within the 
address range that belongs to Georgia Tech campus network.  This address range is 
accessible by both the Georgia Tech campus network and the Internet.    
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As previously stated, the hardware that was used to establish the Honeynet was not 
current state of the art equipment since the machines running on the Honeynet have no 
production value.  The amount of traffic going to and from the Honeynet should be 
minimum since these systems are not running any production software.  The system that 
runs as the Firewall does only that, it has no other applications running on it.  We used 
the LINUX operating system on the firewall.  We ran Red Hat version 8.0 utilizing a 
custom Linux 2.4 kernel (customized to allow for bridging).  Therefore, it was entirely 
possible to set up a Honeynet on a network using surplus equipment that may be 
available within the enterprise. 
Although there are commercial versions of software and products available to establish 
a Honeynet, we chose to establish the Georgia Tech Honeynet using Open Source 
Software.    This is keeping with our goal of using open source software within our 
methodology and open source software provides us with the greatest flexibility.   
We used the rc.firewall script developed by The Honeynet Alliance to set up our 
firewall and establish Data Control for our Honeynet.  This script is available from The 
Honeynet Alliance [50].  The purpose of this script was to perform Network Address 
Translation (NAT) for the target machines on the GEN I Honeynet. Currently, this script 
is functioning in a layer 2 bridging capacity.  The Honeynet firewall does not have a 
Internet routable IP addressed assigned and bridges all data from the Internet to the 
Honeynet at layer 2.  For both GEN I and GEN II Honeynets the script provides data 
control.    
The rc.firewall script was modified to control the Honeynet systems by restricting the 
number of outbound connections that are allowed from target systems on the Honeynet   
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This script also has the capability to pass, drop, or modify outbound data packets 
depending on the specific rule set that is implemented.  This script should work with any 
version of LINUX. 
The IDS that we chose to use to monitor the Honeynet is SNORT.  SNORT is open 
source IDS software [51].  SNORT is primarily signature based but does have an 
anomaly detection plug-in available.  Signatures are available periodically from the 
SNORT website and it is possible to write your own signatures.   The IDS runs on the 
Honeynet firewall which is isolated and not accessible from the Honeynet network.  The 
network monitoring system is currently running Red Hat 8.0 software.   For the GEN I 
Honeynet the system utilized a network interface card (NIC) set in the promiscuous mode 
in a hub that connects all of the computers on the Honeynet.  This NIC card did not have 
an IP address assigned to it so that a hacker on the Honeynet would not have visibility of 
the network monitoring system.  For the GEN II Honeynet employed, monitoring 
occurred within the bridging firewall. 
6.3 Data analysis 
The data that is collected on the Honeynet is stored in two separate locations on the 
monitoring system.  Alerts that are triggered by the SNORT signature database are stored 
in an SQL database.  These alerts are retrievable for display by using the ACID console.  
The Analysis Console for Intrusion Detection, or ACID, was developed by the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT).  If an alert for an exploit does not exist then the 
record of the exploit launched against the Honeynet will not be displayed on the ACID 





Figure 32: ACID Output of Honeynet Alerts 
 
The additional data that is collected using the Data Capture capability of SNORT is 
stored in a daily log file on the monitoring system.  A new directory is created each day 
for this data.  We analyze this data using Ethereal.  Ethereal is Open Source software that 
uses the libpcap library.  Ethereal comes currently installed with most packaged 
installations of Linux software to include Red Hat and is available for download.  
Analyzing the data with Ethereal shows all of the traffic that was sent to or originated 
from the Honeynet.  Ethereal displays the source and destination addresses of this traffic, 
protocol used, source and destination ports and packet content.  It is also possible to 
collect all of the packet contents that correspond to a particular TCP session between an 
attacking machine and the Honeynet machine.  It is possible to recognize automated 
worm type sweeps for various vulnerabilities as well as specific targeted attacks (both 
automated worm-type as well as manual) against specific services by analyzing the 
Honeynet data via Ethereal.  A sample of the Ethereal output is displayed in the following 




Figure 33: Ethereal screen shot of Honeynet Data 
 
The data provide by SNORT is analyzed on a daily basis.  This analysis can be very 
time consuming.  We spend at least one hour per day analyzing our Honeynet data for our 
three computer network Honeynet.  When the Honeynet is attacked and compromised by 
a hacker we usually spend much longer analyzing the data and conducting a forensic 
analysis on the compromised system or systems.  One hour of attack traffic can equate to 
up to forty hours of analysis. When we finish analyzing the previous day’s data, we can 
archive this data to a read-only medium.  We are currently using the X-CD-Roast 
package on a LINUX machine to archive our data to a CD-ROM.  X-CD-Roast is Open 
Source Software [52] which is in keeping with our goal of using this type of software.  It 
has the ability to create multi-session copies on the same CD.  This capability is 
necessary for us since on average we collect less than one megabyte of data per day.  This 
data can be provided to other organizations for analysis. 
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6.4 Statistical Analysis of Honeynet Traffic 
We have been able to conduct an analysis of various worm type exploits that have been 
launched against the Georgia Tech campus network.   The first figure below shows the 
Microsoft SQL Slammer worm traffic directed against the Honeynet.  This worm struck 
the Internet on 25 January 2003, which is the same day that the dramatic increase in 
traffic occurred on the Honeynet.  There was some low level traffic directed against the 
port that this exploit targeted (TCP port 1434) prior to 25 January 2003.    Microsoft 
published an exploit warning concerning this service (SQL) on 24 July 2002.   It may 
have been possible to use the fact that low level traffic was being directed against this 
port as well as the fact that a published exploit existed against this port to anticipate that 
this port may have been subject to an exploit attack.  
 









































































































































Figure 34: SQL Slammer Worm 
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System administrators could have used the fact that an exploit existed against this 
particular port and that low but increasing levels of scans were occurring against this port 
to take countermeasures to secure the service running at this port.  These 
countermeasures could include installing the most recent patches for the affected service 
or to block off-campus access to the target port. 
The next figure below shows the recent exploit traffic directed against the Honeynet 
from the Microsoft Blaster worm.  An exploit against this port was published by 
Microsoft on 16 July 2003 and this exploit was launched  against the Internet on 11 
August 2003.  It is very significant to note that the time between exploit publication and 
worm attack has shrank considerably from approximately six months for SQL Slammer 
to less than one month for the Blaster worm [53]. 
 








































































Figure 35: Microsoft RPC (port 135) exploit 
 
 97
Variations of the Blaster and the Nachi worm continue to appear on the Internet.  One 
possible variant was detected by the Georgia Tech Honeynet on 26 October 2003.    Prior 
to this date the level of Blaster and Nachi traffic was significantly reduced.  On 29 
October 2003 we were able to isolate the exploit that was being used to compromise the 
Microsoft 2000 system on the Honeynet via a Remote Procedure Call exploit.  Analysis 
of this exploit and the files that were uploaded on the compromised machine result in a 
characterization of this exploit as the original Nachi exploit.   The following figure shows 






























































Figure 36: Honeynet RPC Exploit 
This specific exploit targeted TCP port 707 on a system that was compromised by the 
RPC exploit.  The drop in traffic occurring on 3 November 2003 was not due to a 
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reduction in overall traffic targeting port 707.  It was a result of a hacker who 
compromised this specific system using a similar exploit.  This hacker, upon 
compromising this system, disabled the RPC port on this system and then installed an 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) bot (robot) on this system.  Disabling the RPC port reduced the 
level of traffic targeting the vulnerable port on the Honeynet machine.  Investigation of 
this IRC channel indicated that it was being used to illegally download copyrighted 
material.  Further investigation revealed that 26 Georgia Tech machines belonged to this 
IRC channel.  These Georgia Tech machines may have been compromised in a manner 
similar to the compromise that occurred on the Honeynet machine.   
Although our research has been primarily focused on the Linux operating system, the 
Honeynet was able to also produce information concerning the exploit of other operating 
systems (in this case Microsoft 2000) that could be used to detect and classify system 
exploits.     We conducted an analysis of the Microsoft 2000 Honeynet machine to try and 
recognize the specific delta ( ∇ ) characteristic that could be used to identify the rootkit 
that may have been installed on this system. 
Analysis of the Honeynet logs for this exploit showed the actions the hacker took upon 
gaining administrator privileges on this machine via the RPC exploit.  The hacker used 
some form of the original Microsoft Blaster exploit to establish a backdoor Trojan 
connection with administrator privileges on tcp port 4444 on the compromised system 
[54].   The hacker was connecting to the Honeynet system from another system within the 
Georgia Tech domain (fgd06.eastnet.gfatech.edu -128.61.100.134).  We are unable to tell 
if the attack was originating from this address or if this machine was being used as a relay 




The hacker then connected to this system and conducted the following: 
1. Created a batch file to conduct an ftp session with a remote computer 
(128.8.49.73 ) using a username of fbi and a password of cia 
2. Downloaded two files named c.exe and x.exe 
3. Deleted the batch file used for the ftp download. 
4. Executed the programs c.exe and x.exe 
5. Moved to the directory  C:\WINNT\system32\Setup\svchost and starts the IRC 
bot with the batch file svc.bat.  This directory and the file in it did not exist prior 
to the system compromise.  We believe this directory and the files that it 
contains are a result of the c.exe or the x.exe program that was executed by the 
hacker. 
6. The hacker then starts the services that he has associated with the warez server 
capability on this system. 
7. A copy of the Microsoft Windows 2000 DCOM server program 
(WIN2KDCOM.exe) is downloaded from a machine at Old Dominion 
University (128.28.235.158 – garnet.test.odu.edu) and executed on the system. 
8. The hacker then deletes the c.exe and x.exe programs that were downloaded.  
The hacker also hides the new directories that have been created under the 






These directories contain the various tools that the hacker uses to run the IRC bot and 
the warez server.  Figure 37 shows these hidden directories. 
 
  
Figure 37: Hidden directories created by hacker 
 
The figure shows that there are no subdirectories associated with the 
C:/WINNT/system32/setup directory that are displayed by the Microsoft NT Explorer 
tool even when this tool is set to display all hidden files and directories.  However, as 
indicated by the other instances of NT  Explorer in the figure, three subdirectories exist.  
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We were able to access these subdirectories by references their exact path as indicated in 
the Honeynet logs for this exploit.  The Hacker also modified the Registry of this system 
to restart the IRC bot and the warez service upon system reboot.  Figure 38 shows the 
modifications that were made to the Registry.  The registry values listed are the files the 
hacker used when the machine was initially compromised. 
 
 
Figure 38: Modified Registry Entries on Compromised MS Machine 
 
Although our research has been primarily focused on the Linux operating system, we 
were able to apply elements of our methodology as well as data connected from the 
Honeynet to identify delta ( ∇ ) characteristics of  a Microsoft exploit.  These ∇  
characteristics consisted of three new directories being created on the target system as 
well as identifying changes made to the registry.  This delta ∇  can then be used to 




We have demonstrated in this chapter that a Honeynet can be used as a research tool to 
collect information about rootkits for follow-on analysis.  This information can be used to 
classify rootkits as existing, modifications to existing, or entirely new.  The Honeynet can 
also serve to increase the overall level of security on the network where the rootkit is 
installed.  In the next chapter we present a case study concerning the analysis of a 








Detection and Analysis of a Previously Unseen Rootkit 
Part of our research, as stated in Chapter 6, is the use of a Honeynet to collect new 
rootkit type exploits.  Rootkits are also available from other sources to include the 
Internet.  The Honeynet, however,  offers us an opportunity to collect rootkits that may 
not have been previously seen by other researchers [55].  These rootkits are targeted 
against actual live systems on the Honeynet that have been compromised by a hacker.  
We believe that the Honeynet offers us an actual opportunity to collect existing, 
modification to existing, and entirely new rootkit exploits.   
On 1 June 2003 a system installed on the Georgia Tech Honeynet was compromised, 
allowing a hacker to gain root level access.  The hacker then installed  a rootkit on this 
system.  No traffic should have been going to or come from this system since it is a 
honeynet machine.  By following the principles of data capture and data control we were 
able to capture the exploit that the hacker executed against this system and prevent this 
system from being used to compromise any other systems.   
7.1  Target System Description 
The target system that was employed on the Honeynet was a standard version of the 
Red Hat Linux 6.2 operating system running the Linux 2.2 kernel.  This system was 
configured to install all available packages and no special modifications were made to 
this system.  The install process was a default installation for this configuration.  No 
additional services besides those that were started by the default installation were enabled 
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7.2 Method of Compromise 
At 06:34 on the morning of June 1, 2003 an exploit was launched against the target 
system on port 21 (ftp daemon) to attempt to gain root level access.  Red Hat Linux 6.2 
installs with the wu-ftpd2.6.0(1) ftp daemon.  Exploits that allow a hacker to gain root 
level access have been published against this particular service and are available on the 
Internet.  This attack was successful and the hacker was able to gain root level access on 
the target system.  Figure 39 below shows the start of the tcp stream that was extracted 
from the Honeynet data concerning this attack.    The string RNFR  ././  is a signature of 
the WU-FTP exploit for the ftp server that is running on this system [56]. 
 
 
Figure 39: Start of Exploit 
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  The hacker was successful utilizing this exploit to gain root level access on the target 
system.    This is indicated in Figure 40 where the hacker queries the system for his id 
and the user id (uid) of 0(root) is returned.  The hacker then adds a user andrey with a 
password of andrey to the system.   
 
 
Figure 40: System Compromise Indication 
 
The hacker, having gained root access, is now able to install a rootkit on the target 
system.   The rootkit that the hacker chooses to install in called ‘r.tgz’ which was 
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downloaded through a telnet session using the wget command.   We do not believe that 
this particular rootkit has been analyzed before.  There is an ssh rookit called ‘r.tgz’ but 
the characteristics of that rootkit, to include the file size, differ from the rootkit that was 
installed on the target system [57].  In any event, we were unable to find any detailed 
examination of a rootkit called ‘r.tgz’ with characteristics similar to the one that was 
installed on the target system.   
The hacker extracts the exploit code within the ‘r.tgz’ file and then runs the exploit on 
the target system.  Figure 41 shows the actual Honeynet data of the information that was 
provided back to the hacker.  The ‘r.tgz’ rootkit deletes all traces of itself on the target 
system after installation.  However, we are able to reconstruct what the hacker 
accomplished by utilizing the Honeynet logs for this exploit session.  
 
 
Figure 41: Installation of 'r.tgz' rookit 
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7.3  Analysis Process 
The Georgia Tech Honeynet was able to capture the entire exploit session for this 
system compromise to include downloaded files as well as the remote machines that the 
hacker connected to from the compromised machine.  This provided us with the scripts 
and files that were used by the hacker to install the r.tgz rootkit.  Preliminary analysis of 
these files gave us an indication of how this rootkit would install on a target system 
similar to the system on the Honeynet.   We then set out to install the r.tgz  rootkit on a 
target system to analyze and classify it. 
We have initially set up a baseline system that consists of the same operating system as 
the system that was compromised on the Honeynet.  In this case it is Red Hat 6.2 running 
the Linux 2.2.14 kernel.  Following the procedures outlined in Chapter 4, we installed a 
kernel level debugger (kdb) on this system as well as a file integrity checker program 
(AIDE) .  We then installed a known rootkit detection program (chkrootkit) and made a 
copy of the kernel text segment via /dev/kmem.    Prior to infecting this system with the 
r.tgz rootkit  we ran the AIDE and chkrootkit program to establish a clean baseline for 
analysis and classification.  We then infected this system with the r.tgz rootkit.   
The first check that we ran on the infected system is the file integrity check to determine 
what files have been added, changed, or deleted.  Running AIDE on the infected system 
indicates that 2 files have been added to the infected system and 178 files have been 
changed by the r.tgz program.  This is a large number of files and initial analysis of the 
install scripts for this rootkit does not indicate that all of these files are modified.   
Follow-on analysis is conducted on these modified files to determine the nature of these 




Figure 42: AIDE results on r.tgz infected system 
 
The next step was to run the Known Rootkit Detection Program (chkrootkit) on the 
target system.   Running this program  utilizing the binaries that are currently installed on 
the target system only results in the identification of one system binary as being infected.  
The binary that is indicated as being infected is ifconfig.  The chkrootkit program also 
detects five suspicious files and possible infections by the Showtee and Romanian 
rootkits.   
The recommended method of using the chkrootkit program is to use known good binary 
files.  Using known good binary files results in the identification of the same changes 
identified in the previous paragraph plus 5 additional binaries being identified as being 
infected on the target system.  These five binary files are:  du,  ifconfig, killall, ls, and 
pstree.  The check using known good binaries also indicates the following under the lkm 
check:   1 process hidden from readdir command, 15 processes hidden form ps command.  
The differences between the output using known good binaries and the output using the 
binaries currently installed on the system indicate that known good binaries should 
always be used while running the chkrootkit program.  The five files detected as being 
changed by the chkrootkit program are also detected as being changed by the AIDE file 
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integrity check program.  These results are used in our methodology to classify this 
rootkit exploit. 
The next step in the methodology is to verify the integrity of the kernel.  Running the 
kernel check program (kern_check) on the target system utilizing the /boot/System.map 
file indicates that there is a mismatch of 21 system calls between the kernel and the 
/boot/System.map file.  The results of the kern_check program are shown in figure 43. 
 
 
Figure 43: Results of kern_check program 
 
This is an indication that the kernel of the target system may have been compromised 
by the r.tgz rootkit.  Checking the current kernel text segment code against the previously 
archived version of the kernel text segment code that was built when the target system 
was first compiled prior to infection also indicates that the kernel has been compromised. 
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  Analysis of the kernel using kdb indicates that the pointer to the system call table is 
being redirected to a new instance of this table. The correct system call table address is 
0xc0248928 and can be retrieved from the /boot/System.map file.   The current system 
call table address as displayed by kdb in kernel memory is 0xc31ac000.  The following is 
the results of running a kdb query on the system call interrupt within kernel space.  The 
returned call statement should refer to the address of the system call statement that is 
stored in the /boot/System.map file (0xc024928) and it does not.     
 kdb> id Oxc0109d84 ~ (address of system call interrupt from /boot/System.map) 
 system_call + 0x2d:   call *0xc31ac000(,%eax,4) 
This is an indication that the system call table is being redirected by a kernel rootkit 
Since the kernel is a key part of the computer operating system we will first examine 
this aspect of the r.tgz rootkit to determine the method that this rootkit used to 
compromise the target system.   You can not trust any of the system output if the kernel 
has been compromised. 
As previously mentioned, the Honeynet allowed us to retrieve the install scripts and 
code that is utilized by the r.tgz rootkit.  The main install file for the r.tgz rootkit calls a 
series of script files to install the rootkit.  Analysis of these scripts indicates that the 
startfile script is the script that compromises the kernel on the target system.  The replace 
script is used to replace the system binaries.   
The startfile script  copies the r.tgz file init to the /etc/rc.d/init.d directory.  Analysis of 
the r.tgz init file indicated that this is the script that compromises the kernel.  The init file 
executes several binary files named sendmail (executed as a daemon),  write (executed as 
a daemon),  and two instances of the executable all with the ‘i’ switch and a pid.  The 
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sendmail binary file is actually another instance of the all program that is copied over in 
the createdir script file that is executed by the r.tgz startup script file.  This analysis 
resulted in the identification of three instances of the all binary executable file being 
executed by the r.tgz rootkit.  Two of these instances of the all binary file have pid’s  
associated with them.   The fact that the init file, which calls these three instances of the 
all file, has been copied into the /etc/rc.f/init.d  directory is an indication that the r.tgz 
rootkit developer wanted this code to be executed upon system reboot, making the kernel 
compromise portion of this rootkit resident within memory.  As a result of this analysis, 
we choose to examine the all program.  This program is a binary executable file and we 
do not have the underlying source code that was used to create this rootkit.  We choose to 
use a tool such as strings on this file initially in conducting our analysis.  An segment of 




Figure 44: strings output of r.tgz all program 
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The strings output of this program indicates that the all program is a kernel level 
rootkits known as INKIT.  A search on the Internet for a kernel rootkit called INKIT does 
not result in any references to this particular rootkit.  According to the use statement that 
is output by the strings command the ‘i’ switch that is used in the init script with a 
particular pid is used to make that pid invisible.  The last string displayed in the figure is 
significant to note.  This text string makes reference to the SuckIT rootkit.  We present an 
in depth analysis of the SuckIT  kernel level rootkit in the appendix.  The fact that this 
string appears in INKIT, including the misspelling of successfully just like the actual 
SuckIT rootkit, leads us to believe that INKIT is a modification or a copy of the SuckIT 
kernel level rootkit.  We then attempt to uninstall the INKIT kernel level rootkit using the 
‘u’ switch as indicated by the use statement in Figure 45.  
  
 
Figure 45: Uninstall of INKIT kernel rootkit 
 
This command is successful in uninstalling the kernel level rootkit.  We then verify the 
integrity of the kernel with the kern_check kernel integrity check program.  The 
indication is that there are no system calls currently being redirected by the kernel.  An 
examination of the kernel using kdb indicates that the system call interrupt is now 
referencing the correct system call table.  As a final check, we compare the current kernel 
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text segment against the original archived text segment.  These files now match.  At this 
point the kernel is no longer compromised and we rerun the file integrity checker and 
known rootkit detection programs on the target system since we can now trust the kernel 
output.  The output from the AIDE file integrity check program now indicates that 196 
files have changed.  This is an increase of 19 files from the previous check of the AIDE 
program where 177 files were detected as being changed by the r.tgz rootkit.  It appears 
that the kernel element of the r.tgz rootkit was hiding these 19 changed programs from 
the AIDE program.  We will analyze these changed files and the r.tgz install scripts to 
determine how these files have been changed.  The results of the new instance of the 
AIDE program are indicated in Figure 46. 
 
 
Figure 46: New AIDE results on target system. 
 
Analysis of the install scripts for the r.tgz rootkit does not indicate that 196 files are 
being changed when the rootkit is installed.    Analysis of the AIDE results indicates that 
all of the executable files in the /bin directory are changing.   Comparison of the files in 
the /bin directory with known good files indicates that the files that are not being changed 
by the r.tgz rootkit are increasing in size by 8759 bytes.  This increase in file size is a 
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signature of the Linux.OSF.8759 virus.  This virus is associated with the hax.tgz rootkit 
[58]. Application of the methodology thus far has indicated that r.tgz is composed of 
elements of two rootkits; the INKIT kernel level rootkit which is based on SuckIT, and 
the hax.tgz binary level rootkit.   
Another signature of the Linux.OSF.8759 virus is that a trojan port is opened on the 
target system at 3049.  This trojan port is detected by the chkrootkit program which 
checks for processes listening on ports with the use of the netstat command with the –anp 
switch to detect open ports on the system in question.   Other Trojan ports can be detected 
in a similar fashion. 
There is a utility named clean.OSF.8759-ps that can be used to clean infection of the 
Linux.OSF.8759 virus [59].  However, these files can not be cleaned by the root user 
after the r.tgz rootkit is installed on the target system.  This is a result of the socklist script 
within the r.tgz rootkit changing the attributes on all of the files in the /bin directory with 
the chattr  +ASacdisu command.  Attributes on selected files in the /sbin and /usr/bin 
directories are also reset by the replace script within the r.tgz rootkit after these files are 
infected with the Linux.OSF.8759 virus.  Files and directories with their attributes reset 
could be used as an indication that a possible rootkit is installed on the target system.  
These attributes must be turned off using the chattr  -ASacdisu command to disinfect 
these files.   
To produce an accurate count of the number of binary files that are added, deleted, or 
changed by the r.tgz rootkit the attributes of the files within the /bin, /sbin, and /user/bin 
directories must first be reset.  Then these directories can be disinfected with the 
clean.OSF.9759-ps utility.    Once these files and directories have been disinfected the 
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AIDE program is run to provide an accurate count of the files that have been changed on 
the target system by the r.tgz rootkit.  Figure 47 shows the results of this instance of the 
AIDE program on the target system.  The results are that 2 files have been added and 14 




Figure 47: Accurate AIDE count of changed files 
7.4 Rootkit Characteristics 
The chkrootkit program only detects 5 of the 14 files that are detected as being changed 
by the AIDE program.  It may be possible to develop new signatures for the 9 changed 
files that are not detected by chkrootkit.  These files are: dir, vdir, md5sum, top, and 
strings in the /usr/bin directory; ps, netstat, and login in the /bin directory; and ifconfig in 
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the /sbin directory.  Two other possible signatures are the two added files, /usr/bin/strings 
and /sbin/sendmail.   There are currently two instances of the strings command in the 
/usr/bin directory.  The socklist script of the r.tgz rootkit copies the original 
/usr/bin/strings file to the following file: /usr/bin/strings<blank space>.  This would make 
it hard to detect that this file has been tampered with under a visual examination.  
However, this is a signature that can be used to detect the presence of either the r.tgz 
rootkit of the binary elements that make up the r.tgz rootkit on the target system.   
Using the elements of the methodology that we have proposed in section 5.1 we are able 
to detect some possible unique string signatures in the binary files that are replaced by the 
r.tgz rootkit.  The following are potential string signatures that can be used by a program 
such as chkrootkit to detect the presence of the r.tgz rootkit binary file replacements. 
/usr/bin/dir     “stpcpy” 
/usr/bin/vdir    “/usr/include/file.h” 
/usr/bin/md5sum  “/usr/local/share/locale” 
/usr/bin/top   “proc_hackinit” 
/usr/bin/strings  “/bin/su  –“ 
/usr/bin/socklist  “bin/egrep  –v” 
/bin/ps   “/tmp/extfsRNV23Z” 
/bin/netstat   “__bzero” 
/bin/login   “cococola” 
We have already characterized the kernel rootkit that is an element of r.tgz.  This kernel 
rootkit is one that redirects the system call table to an entirely new system call table as 
described in section 2.4.2.  Based on other analysis that we have done, we were able to 
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uninstall and reinstall this rootkit on the target system.  It is significant to note that every 
new reinstallation of this kernel level rootkit will results in a new address in kernel space 
for the new instance of the compromised system call table.   
As previously stated, we concluded that the r.tgz rootkit is a blended rootkit that 
contains elements of the INKIT kernel rootkit and the hax.tgz binary rootkit.   The INKIT 
rootkit is based on SuckIT.  The hax.tgz rootkit is based on bigwar.tgz rootkit [58]. 
7.5 Summary 
We have applied our methodology to a rootkit that we were able to acquire on the 
Honeynet research network that we established at Georgia Tech.  Our methodology 
enabled us to identify the binary elements that this rootkit replaced on the target system.  
New signatures were identified that can help to detect the presence of this rootkit.  
The methodology enabled us to characterize the kernel element of this rootkit as a 
modification to an already existing kernel rootkit.  We were able to uninstall this kernel 
rootkit on the target system. 
The analysis that we have presented concerning the application of our methodology to a 
rootkit would benefit network administrators, researchers, and network security personnel 




Conclusions and Further Recommendations 
The objective of our research was to develop a methodology  for detecting and 
classifying rootkit exploits.  There is no standardized methodology at present to 
characterize rootkits that compromise the security of computer systems.  The goal of our 
methodology was to provide network system administrators, network security personnel, 
and security researchers with techniques to determine if a rootkit has been installed on 
their systems and to be able to classify these rootkits as existing, modification to existing, 
or entirely new.  Current methods may only indicate that a system may be infected with a 
rootkit without characterizing the rootkit.   The ability to characterize rootkits will 
provide system administrators, researchers, and security personnel with the information 
necessary to take the best possible recovery actions. This may also help to detect and 
fingerprint additional instances and prevent further security instances involving rootkits.   
The vulnerabilities that exist in modern operating systems as well the proliferation of 
exploits that allow hackers to gain root access on networked computer systems provide 
the ability to install rootkits.  System administrators need to be aware of the threats that 
their computers face from rootkits as well as the ability to recognize if a particular rootkit 
has been installed on their computer system.    In this research, we focused on defining a 
mathematical framework to define rootkit exploits as well as a formalized methodology 
to follow to characterize rootkits.   In this chapter, we summarize our methodology. 
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8.1  Contributions 
• We conducted an in-depth analysis of  rootkits to include a description of what 
constitutes a rootkit.  Modern hackers use rootkits as a tool to conceal their activity on 
a compromised computer.  Different levels of rootkits were examined to include 
application level rootkits, trojan or system utility rootkits and kernel rootkits.  
Application rootkits are programs installed by a hacker to allow for backdoor 
connectivity on the target  system.  They normally do not replace or modify any 
existing programs.  Trojan utility rootkits will alter or replace some trusted binary 
utility on the target system.  These utilities are normally used by system 
administrators to provide accurate information on the system in question.  The two 
currently existing types of  kernel level rootkits were described.  These include kernel 
level rootkits that modify the system call table and kernel level rootkits that redirect 
the system call table.  Both of these types of kernel rootkits do not install or replace 
any programs on the target system.  Kernel rootkits are very difficult to detect and 
characterize using existing methods.  We believe that it is necessary to have an in-
depth understanding of rootkits to be able to detect and characterize them. 
•  We examined current rootkit detection and prevention methodologies.  This included 
a review of current general public license (GPL) tools available on the Internet.  Our 
research addressed strengths and limitations of these tools when used to both detect 
and classify rootkits.   GPL programs that are designed to maintain system integrity 
and prevent rootkit exploitation were also examined.   A significant issue concerning 
these tools is that they must already installed on a target system prior to the attempted 
installation of a rootkit.   These tools are to be considered “White Hat” kernel level 
 
 120
rootkits since they modify the kernel on the target system to protect this system from 
malicious rootkits.  These tools are designed to maintain system integrity and have no 
capability to classify rootkits.    We also examined “Black Box” or Dynamic Program 
Analysis as a method of detecting and classifying rootkit exploits.  This method of 
analysis showed promise in detecting application or binary programs but we 
demonstrated a failure concerning the detection of a kernel rootkit.  The reason for 
this is due to the fact that a kernel rootkit modifies the kernel, or “Black Box” that is 
to be analyzed.  We then examined the current rootkit detection methodology that is 
employed by the campus network security personnel at the Georgia Institute of 
Technology.   These methods currently include both manual and automated 
procedures.    Our research indicated that there is no formalized methodology 
currently existing to detect or characterize rootkit exploits.   
• We proposed a formal methodology to characterize rootkits.   This methodology 
helps network system administrators in increasing the security level of their networks.   
It allows for characterization of threats that a network may face which in turn allow 
for the appropriate steps to be taken to best secure a network.  This formal 
methodology is based on the identification of a specific delta ( ∇ ) , or identifiable 
characteristic between the rootkit being examined and the underlying program that is 
being used as a baseline for comparison.  New signatures can be generated for 
rootkits based on the application of our methodology and the identification of these ∇  
characteristics.    We present a framework that can be used to define rootkits as 
existing, modification to existing, or entirely new.   This provides for a formal 
method to classify rootkits.   We then developed a methodology to include the 
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establishment of a testing platform and the sequential steps that are to be taken to 
identify characteristics to be used for rootkit detection and classification. 
• We implemented methods to detect and classify rootkit exploits by identification of 
particular ∇  characteristics.  These methods demonstrated the ability to identify ∇  
characteristics in rootkits that replaced system utilities as well as those that target the 
kernel of the operating system.  We proposed techniques that could be used to detect 
unique string signatures in binary rootkits as well as the ability to detect unique string 
signatures in binary rootkits that employ string hiding techniques.  We also proposed 
a method to detect kernel rootkits that redirect the system call table.    Application of 
these methods should result in a ∇  that can be classified as belonging to an existing 
rootkit, modification to an existing rootkit, or to an entirely new rootkit. 
• We established a Honeynet to collect rootkits for our research.  Our methodology 
requires that we possess a copy of the rootkit in order to follow our methodology to 
detect and classify it.   In addition, we demonstrated that a Honeynet can also be used 
to help secure a large enterprise network such as the one at Georgia Tech.  We 
conducted statistical analysis of various worm type exploits that were run against the 
Honeynet.  Our research is focused on the Linux operating system but data collected 
from the Honeynet enabled us to apply elements of our methodology against another 
operating system (Microsoft 2000) that was exploited.  We detected specific 
∇ characteristics of this exploit that can be used to detect and classify it. 
• We applied our methodology against a new rootkit that we retrieved from a 
compromised Linux system that was installed on the Honeynet.   This rootkit was 
unknown to us and we could find no reference to a rootkit of this type on the Internet.  
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Our analysis revealed this was a ‘blended’ rootkit that contained elements of both 
binary and kernel rootkits.  Application of our methodology enable us to identify 
specific ∇  characteristics that can be used to detect and classify this rootkit. 
8.2   Future Research 
Suggestions for future research: 
• Establish a methodology to re-establish trust on a system that has been compromised 
by a rootkit.  It should be possible to accomplish this as a result of the 
characterization of the rootkit.  However, in order to accomplish this,  there must be 
an underlying element within the operating system that can be trusted.   
• Investigate the possibility of  the distribution of rootkit characterization signature 
databases.  Organizations such as the Honeynet Alliance [83] exist to collaborate 
concerning the collection and analysis of Honeynet data.  Our methodology could be 
applied to the rootkits that are collected by the Honeynet Alliance in order to build a 
repository of various rootkit characteristics. 
• Automate the methodology of detecting and classifying rootkit exploits.  At present, 
many of the processes within the methodology are manual.   It may be possible to 











A.1 The Linux Rootkit IV (lrk4) 
The Linux RootKit IV (lrk4) was released in November of 1998 by Lord Somer.  It 
includes the usual rootkit components: a sniffer, utilities to edit and erase log files, and 
Trojan replacement system utility programs [60].   More recent versions of the lrk rootkit 
exist.  The source code for Version 5 is also available on the Internet in addition to lrk4 
source code for systems with and without shadow passwords.   There is also a 
precompiled version of lrk4 that is available for downloading [61].  The lrk4 code 
continues to be modified and improved upon.  An update to lrk4 was posted on the 
internet as recently as 11 May 2000 [62].     
We followed our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The following 
steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit: 
1. The file integrity checker program AIDE was run on this system 
2. A copy of the kernel text code was produced. 
3. The known rootkit detection program, chkrootkit, was run on this system.   
All of these steps were taken prior to infecting this system with the lrk4 rootkit.  At this 
point the lrk4 rootkit was installed on the target system.  The shadow password 
installation was utilized during this installation. 
The AIDE program detected that 8 files had been changed on this system after the 
installation of the lrk4 rootkit.  However, the chkrootkit program only detected that 6 files 
had been infected.  The two files that were not detected by the chkrootkit program were 
 
 124
the netstat file and the chsh file.   Figure 49 shows the changed files that were detected by 
the AIDE program. 
 
 
Figure 48: AIDE results on lrk4 infected system 
 
The integrity of the kernel was not compromised by the installation of the lrk4 rootkit.  
The kern_check program did not detect the redirection of any system calls.  A 
comparison between the current kernel text segment and the archived kernel text segment 
that was produced prior to the infection matched.   
We then examined the two files that were not detected by the chkrootkit program to 
identify signatures that can be utilized for detection.  Using the previously developed 
methods we identified the following potential signatures: 
/usr/bin/chsh   “login.defs” 
/bin/netstat   “written” 
Based on this analysis we determine that the lrk4 rootkit is a Trojan Utility rootkit as 
described in section 2.3. 
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Analysis of the lrk4 login source code 
We chose to do a detailed examination of  the login code that exists in the lrk4 rootkit 
written by Lord Somer.  The login executable file was detected by both AIDE and the 
chkrootkit program.  The AIDE program indicated the checksums for this file stored in 
the database no longer matched the current checksums produced for this file.  The 
chkrootkit program indicated that this file was now infected. 
The login code used by Red Hat 6.2 is derived from 4.3 BSD software, as indicated by 
the data provided from the Red Hat Package Manager (rpm) source code file [63].   The 
login code utilized in the lrk4 rootkit exploit is based on code written by John F. Haugh II 
as indicated by the code provided in the exploit [62].   The first significant difference 
between these two programs is that the clean version of the login program does not 
support the use of shadow passwords unless Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) is 
available on the system.   PAM is available on the Red Hat 6.2 installation of Linux.   
The hacked login code used in lrk4 uses the Shadow-Suite of software to support the use 
of shadow passwords. 
The Shadow-Suite software is a package of shadow password file utilities.  This 
package contains the necessary programs to convert traditional System V & UNIX 
password files to SVR4 shadow passwords.  This package also contained the necessary 
programs to maintain the shadow and group files that work with both shadow and non-
shadow passwords [64].  According to the man page, PAM is described as a system of 
libraries that handles the authentication tasks of applications and services on the system.  
Authentication is dynamically configurable with PAM. 
Red Hat 6.2 did not install with the Shadow-Suite of software, but it did install with 
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PAM.  The use of shadow passwords is established during the installation of the Red Hat 
6.2 software, and PAM supports these shadow passwords.  There is an rpm available to 
install the Shadow-Suite on the Red Hat 6.2 system (shadow-utils-19990827-10.rpm), but 
it must be installed manually after installation of the Red Hat software.  Versions of 
Linux available from other vendors may install with the Shadow-Suite.  The availability 
of an rpm for Shadow-Suite may have been the reason why the Shadow-Suite version of 
login was modified in the lrk4 rootkit as opposed to modifying PAM and the login code 
that works with it.   
A.2 The Linux Rootkit V (lrk5) 
The Linux Rootkit V (lrk5) was released by the same author as lrk4, Lord Somer.  In 
the README file for this rootkit, Lord Somer makes reference to hacked versions of the 
ssh daemon and the su utility [65].  This rootkit has been described as one of the most 
fully featured rootkits presently available [66].  Analysis of the source code indicated that 
it is based on the previously developed lrk4 rootkit.  Like lrk4, this rootkits also utilizes 
the Shadow Suite of software. 
We once again followed our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
following steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit: 
1. The file integrity checker program AIDE was run on this system 
2. A copy of the kernel text code was produced. 
3. The known rootkit detection program, chkrootkit, was run on this system.   
All of these steps were taken prior to infecting this system with the lrk5 rootkit.  At this 
point the lrk5 rootkit was installed on the target system.  The shadow password 
installation was utilized during this installation. 
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 The AIDE program detected that 11 files had been changed on this system after the 
installation of the lrk5 rootkit.  Only 8 files were detected as being changed upon 
installation of the lrk4 rootkit.  The chkrootkit program only detected that five files had 
been infected.  The six files that were not detected by the chkrootkit program are the 
netstat file, chsh file (both results similar to lrk4) and the chage, gpasswd, newgrp, and 
su.   The AIDE program also detected that two files are added to the system by the lrk5 
rootkit.  These files are: /usr/bin/expiry and /bin/sg.  Both of these new files are potential 
signatures that can be used to detect installation of the lrk5 rootkit.  Figure 49 shows the 
changed files that are detected by the AIDE program. 
 
 
Figure 49: AIDE results on lrk5 infected system 
 
Like the lrk4 rootkit, the lrk5 rootkit did not compromise the integrity of the kernel.  
The kern_check program did not detect the redirection of any system calls.  A 
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comparison between the current kernel text segment and the archived kernel text segment 
that was produced prior to the infection matched.   
We then examine the six files that were not detected by the chkrootkit program to 
identify signatures that can be utilized for detection.  Using the previously developed 
methods we identify the following potential signatures: 
/usr/bin/chsh   “login.defs”    (same signature as lrk4) 
/usr/bin/chage  “etc/spwd” 
/usr/bin/gpasswd  “etc/grp” 
/usr/bin/newgrp  “Sorry” 
/bin/su   “etc/porttime” 
/bin/netstat   “written”   (same signature as lrk4) 
 
We compared the string output of several of the lrk5 modified files to the same 
modified file from lrk4 for comparison.  These files matched.  Based on this analysis we 
determine that the lrk5 rootkit is a modification to the lrk4 Trojan Utility rootkit as 
described in section 2.3. 
A.3 The t0rn rootkit 
The t0rn rootkit was designed to be quickly installed on a vulnerable target system 
without requiring a high level of skill.  This rootkit, unlike lrk4 and lrk5 has the ability to 
match the timestamp of the original files that it replaces with trojan binary files [67].  It 
was only available in a precompiled version so there is no source code currently available 
for analysis.   The author of the t0rn rootkit was arrested in the United Kingdom in a Joint 
Scotland Yard/FBI operation [68]. 
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The code for the t0rn rootkit was incorporated into the li0n worm [69].   The quick and 
easy installation of the t0rn rootkit most likely led to its incorporation into an automated 
worm type attack.  This worm was very successful in infecting vulnerable systems on the 
Internet [70].   
We continued to follow our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.  Unlike the lrk4 and lrk5 rootkits there was no 
option to use the shadow passwords. 
The AIDE program detected that eight files have been changed on this system after the 
installation of the t0rn rootkit.  Eight files were also detected as being changed upon 
installation of the lrk4 rootkit.  However, only four files match as being changed between 
these two rootkits.  These files are find, netstat, login, and ifconfig.  The files that do not 
match are du, top, ls, and ps.  The AIDE program also detected that the file /sbin/xlogin 
has been added to the system.  The chkrootkit program only detected that only three files 
had been infected.  These files are ifconfig, login, and ps.  The five files that were not 
detected by the chkrootkit program are netstat, du, top, ls, ps, and find.   The chkrootkit 
program does detect the presence of the t0rn rootkit on the target system.  It accomplishes 
this by searching for the file /sbin/xlogin.  The chkrootkit program also checks for any 
directories named “.puta” which are directories that are created upon installation of the 
t0rn rootkit.  This is the file that is detected as being added to the system by the AIDE 





Figure 50: AIDE results on t0rn infected system 
 
Like the lrk4 and lrk5 rootkit, the t0rn rootkit did not compromise the integrity of the 
kernel.  The kern_check program did not detect the redirection of any system calls.  A 
comparison between the current kernel text segment and the archived kernel text segment 
that was produced prior to the infection matched.   
We then examine the five files that were not detected by the chkrootkit program to 
identify signatures that can be utilized for detection.  Using the previously developed 
methods we identified the following potential signatures: 
/usr/bin/du   “.puta”     
/usr/bin/top   “.puta” 
/usr/bin/find   “.puta” 
bin/ls    “.puta” 
/bin/netstat   “.puta” 
It is significant to note that the same string signature can be used to detect all five of 
these files that are compromised by the t0rn rootkit.  Analysis of the t0rn rootkit indicated 
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that .puta is a hidden directory that is created and used by this rootkit. 
We compared the string output of several of the t0rn modified files to the same 
modified file from lrk4 for comparison.  These files did not match.  Based on this 
analysis we determine that the torn rootkit is not related to lrk4 or lrk5. 
A.4 The ark rootkit 
The Ambient Rootkit for Linux, or ark, is available for download from the Internet.  
This rootkit, like the t0rn rootkit was designed to be quickly installed on a vulnerable 
target system without requiring a high level of skill.  This rootkit, unlike the t0rn rootkit, 
does not have the ability to match the timestamp of the original files that it replaces with 
trojan binary files.  It was only available in a precompiled version so there is no source 
code currently available for analysis.    There is no documentation concerning this rootkit 
currently available on the Internet. 
Figure 52 shows the install script for this rootkit on the target system.   The README 
file for this rootkit does not include installation instructions.   
 
 
Figure 51: ark rootkit installation script 
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We continued to follow our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.    The ark rootkit contains executable files to address 
both the use of normal and shadow passwords (login-normal and login-shadow).  The 
install script was able to make a determination to use the login-shadow file for the target 
system.  This is indicated by the line “Passwd? Shadowed” in Figure 51. 
The AIDE program detected that nine files had been changed on this system after the 
installation of the ark rootkit.  These same nine files are indicated as being replaced by 
the ark install script.  The chkrootkit program detected all nine of the files that were 
replaced by the ark rootkit on the target system.  In addition, the chkrootkit program does 
detect the presence of the ark rootkit on the target system.  It accomplishes this by 
searching for the directory /dev/ptyxx.  Figure 52 shows the changed files that are 
detected by the AIDE program. 
 
 
Figure 52: AIDE results from an ark infected system 
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Like the t0rn rootkit, the ark rootkit did not compromise the integrity of the kernel.  The 
kern_check program did not detect the redirection of any system calls.  A comparison 
between the current kernel text segment and the archived kernel text segment that was 
produced prior to the infection matched.   
This is the first case that we have analyzed in which the chkrootkit program was able to 
detect all of the files that were listed as being changed by the AIDE File Integrity 
Checker program.  It is not necessary to produce any new string signatures for the ark 
rootkit.  A system administrator could follow this methodology to ensure that the 
chkrootkit program was capable of detecting all files modified on any suspect systems by 
a rootkit such as ark, that is, the system administrator would not have to produce any 
additional signatures that needed to be checked. 
Comparison of the executable replacement files with the executable replacement files 
from the t0rn rootkit as well as lrk4 and lrk5 do not indicate that any of these files are 
similar.  However, analysis of the login program from the ark rootkit indicates that it is 
based on a later version of the Shadow-Suite of software than was used to develop the 
lrk4 and lrk5 rootkits.  Therefore, ark may be a modification to the lrk4 and lrk5 rootkits. 
A.5 The knark rootkit 
An initial analysis of knark was conducted by Toby Miller in 2001 [71].   The knark 
rootkit is a kernel level rootkit as described in section 2.4.1.  Various versions for knark 
are available on the Internet.  We chose to examine version 0.59, which is the last known 
version to have been authored by CREED.  The version of the rootkit can be installed on 
the Linux 2.2 kernel but will not install on the Linux 2.4 kernel.  CREED is identified as 
the original author of knark.  This version of knark can be downloaded from the 
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packetstorm web site [72].  There is also an interview with CREED that is available for 
download on the web [73].   
Another analysis of knark was conducted by Jonathan Clemmens [75].   In this analysis, 
the link is made between knark and an earlier kernel level rootkit known as “heroin.c”.  
The link to “heroin.c” is also made in the interview with CREED.  The following are 
recognized “features” of the knark kernel level rootkit: 
• Hide/Unhide files or directories 
• Hide TCP/UDP connections 
• Execution Redirection 
• Unauthenticated privilege escalation via the rootme program within knark 
• Ability to change UID/GID of a running process 
• Unauthenticated, privileged remote execution daemon 
• Kill –31 to hide a running process 
 The uses of file hiding and execution redirection allow a hacker to install a backdoor on 
the target system that may not be detected through conventional system analysis.   
We once again followed our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.   
The AIDE program did not detect any file modifications after the knark rootkit was 
installed on the target system.  The chkrootkit program did detect the presence of the 
knark rootkit.    This program looks for the creation of certain directories as a result of a 
system being infected with a rootkit.  The knark kernel rootkit creates a directory called 
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knark in the /proc/ directory.    A system infected with the knark kernel level rootkit can 
be detected by chkrootkit because of the presence of this directory.  We speculate that the 
developer of knark, CREED, specifically chose the /proc/ directory for the sub-directory 
that is to be created.  The /proc/ directory is one that is constantly changing during the 
operation of the computer.  Any new process that is started will have a separate directory 
created here.  Because of this, the /proc/ directory is normally not chosen as a directory 
that is checked with a cryptographic signature.  This hidden directory is created by knark 
and the chkrootkit program looks for this specific directory.   chkrootkit also checks the 
system logs.  Therefore the signature must be known for chkrootkit to detect if a rootkit 
has been installed on a system.    The code in the chkrootkit script file that is used to 
detect an infection by knark is shown in Figure 53.   
## knark LKM 
if [ -d /proc/knark]; then 
   echo “Warning: Knark LKM installed” 
fi 
Figure 53: chkrootkit code to detect knark lkm 
We find it unusual that the knark rootkit does not use its directory hiding capability to 
hide this directory.  The chkrootkit check can be defeated if this directory is renamed to 
something besides /proc/knark.    Figure 54 shows the output of the chkrootkit program 
on a system that is infected with the knark rootkit.   
 
 
Figure 54: chkrootkit output of knark infected system 
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The kern_check program does detect that eight system calls have been modified on the 
target system.  The output indicates that the addresses of these eight sys_calls currently 
listed in the sys_call_table do not match the addresses for those sys_calls in the original 
map of the kernel symbols.  This map of kernel systems is available on the system as 
/boot/System.map.  It is theoretically possible for another kernel level rootkit to change 
the same eight system calls.  Figure 55 shows the results of running the kern_check 
program on the target system.   
 
 
Figure 55: kern_check results on knark infected system 
 
These results show the danger of kernel rootkits such as knark.  File integrity checker 
programs such as AIDE will not detect any modifications on the target system.  Programs 
such as chkrootkit can be defeated if a known signature is not available.    
Our methodology depends on the ability to archive a copy of the system call code that 
currently exists in kernel memory for characterization analysis.  It is this archived code 
that we use to be able to characterize kernel rootkit exploits.  We have developed a C 
program that can copy the system call code that is referenced by a start and end address 
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and write the executable object code to a file for future reference.  We feel that this is 
significant because it allows the analyst to be able to retrieve of the code that is currently 
running in the system kernel.  Further, some types of kernel level rootkits such as knark 
do not remain resident in memory after the system is rebooted.   Our program allows for a 
copy of any suspicious system calls to be copied offline for follow on analysis prior to 
rebooting the system. 
Analysis of the source code used to create the knark rootkit indicated that the new 
redirected system calls were being written sequentially into kernel memory.  This may 
not always be the case and it may be necessary to conduct an analysis of the object code 
to identify start and end address of the individual system calls.   
The archived files can be examined with a tool such as binary visual editor (bvi) which 
is available on the Internet [75].  The output of bvi is the addresses of the data relative to 
the beginning of the file (far left), the actual data in  hexadecimal notation (center), and 
the data in ASCII format (far right) as indicated in Figure 56.  One can search within the 
file hexadecimal notation for the start and end of each system call by looking for the 
individual opcodes for pushing and popping the registers (each system call is a separate C 
code routine that will push and pop values on to the stack.  You can also identify the end 
of each system call routine by looking for the one byte return opcode (ret – C3 in the Intel 
x86 architecture [76]). 
Figure 56 shows us the bvi output for the knark_getdents system call that replaces the 
original sys_getdents system call.  This system call is used by the kernel to output the 
contents of a directory. Kernel level rootkits may choose to compromise this system call 
to hide files and directories on the target system.  The binary ls command on the system 
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that has the rootkit installed does not have to be modified in this case. 
 
 
Figure 56: bvi analysis of getdents system call 
 
The archived system calls that are installed by the rootkit can be used by system 
administrators and security personnel to develop a fingerprint for a particular kernel 
rootkit such as knark.  A comparison between the current kernel text segment and the 
archived kernel text segment that was produced prior to the infection matched.  This 
indicates that knark did not modify the kernel text segment of code and indicates that 
knark is a kernel level rootkit that modifies the sys_call_table, as described in section 
2.4.1.  The sys_call_table is not maintained within the kernel text segment of kernel 
memory.   
A.6 The adore rootkit 
The adore rootkit is described as a Linux LKM rootkit that is easy to install.  It only 
requires minor configuration adjustments.  The adore kernel rootkit has the capability to 
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hide files and PID’s.  This rootkit will also establish a backdoor port for the hacker to 
connect to upon installation.  It is also possible to uninstall adore using the ava utility that 
installs with the rootkit. [77] 
We once again followed our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.   
The AIDE program did not detect any file modifications after the adore rootkit was 
installed on the target system.  The chkrootkit program did not detect the presence of the 
adore rootkit.    At present there are no signatures available to the chkrootkit developers 
to detect adore.   Unlike knark, adore does not create any files or directories on the target 
system. 
The kern_check program does detect that twelve system calls are modified on the target 
system.  The output indicates that the addresses of these twelve sys_calls currently listed 
in the sys_call_table do not match the addresses for those sys_calls in the original map of 
the kernel symbols (/boot/System.map).  Figure 57 shows the results of running the 
kern_check program on the target system.   
 
 
Figure 57: kern_check results on adore infected system 
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A comparison was made between the current kernel text segment and the archived 
kernel text segment that was produced prior to the infection matched.  This indicates that 
like knark, adore did not modify the kernel text segment of code and indicates that adore 
is a kernel level rootkit that modifies the sys_call_table, similar to the knark rootkit.  This 
may indicate that knark and adore may be related.   
Four of the twelve system calls that are changed by adore are also changed by knark.  
These four system calls are: sys_getdents, sys_fork, sys_clone, and sys_kill.  However, a 
comparison of the kernel code for the adore system calls and the knark system calls 
indicates that these system calls are different.    We retrieved the system call code from 
within the kernel with the program that we have previously discussed. We therefore 
conclude that the adore rootkit is different from the knark rootkit.    
During our analysis of the adore rootkit we recognized another method to identify the 
ending address of a system call within kernel memory.  If the object file that the kernel 
rootkit utilizes to install on the target system is still available on that target system, then it 
may be possible to determine the exact end address of the system call within kernel 
memory.  In the case of the adore rootkit, this file was called the adore.o file.  The start 
address of each system call can be determined from the output of the kern_check program 
(see figure 57 concerning adore).  We have already discussed use of the bvi program to 
determine the ending address as well as using the output of the kern_check program if 
you can assume that the system calls are written sequentially in kernel space.   The exact 
ending address may be available within the object file.  Using a program such as the 
GNU debugger (gdb), it may be possible to disassemble each replaced system call.  To do 
this you must know the name of the replacement system calls within the object file.  The 
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names of the replacement system calls can be determined from any source code files that 
may be available from the rootkit.  Figure 58 shows the results of disassembling an adore 
system call (sys_fork).   
 
 




The final statement of this disassembled code is a return statement (ret) which we have 
previously discussed.  According to gdb,  the sys_fork system call replacement, which is 
named n_fork in the adore source code is 83 bytes in size.  The start address of this 
system call as indicated by the kern_check output is 0xc40ad438.  Adding 83 bytes to this 
address gives an ending address of 0xc40ad48b.  The next system call in sequence is the 
sys_clone system call, which starts at address 0xc40ad48c. 
A.7 The knark rootkit targeting the Linux 2.4 kernel 
The knark rootkit developed by CREED described in Appendix A.5 was targeted 
against the Linux 2.2 kernel and was not capable of installing on the Linux 2.4 kernel.  
This rootkit was ported over to the Linux 2.4 kernel by an individual known as 
Cyberwind.  The name of this version of knark is knark-2.4.3 and it is based on knark-
0.59 described in A.5.   
There is a README.cyberwind file that describes some of the necessary changes that 
were required to install this system on the Linux 2.4 kernel.  The following changes were 
required: 
1. Rewrite of the /proc code since node registration and cleanup differs in the 
Linux 2.4 kernel from the Linux 2.2 kernel. 
2. Linux 2.4 use of getdents64 to identify a dentry and as a result, sys_getdents64 
must now be intercepted for this kernel rootkit to work as intended. 
We once again follow our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.  Like the previous version of knark, the AIDE 
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program did not detect any file modifications after this new version of the knark rootkit 
was installed on the target system.  The chkrootkit program did detect the presence of this 
knark rootkit.    This version of the knark kernel rootkit also creates a directory called 
knark in the /proc/ directory.    The same check can be made by chkrootkit because of the 
presence of this same directory.  Like the previous version of knark a comparison 
between the current kernel text segment and the archived kernel text segment that was 
produced prior to the infection matched.   
This version of knark changes nine system calls.  The earlier version of knark changed 
eight system calls.  The newer version on knark changes the same eight system calls as 
the previous version of knark and also changes the sys_getdents64 system call.  The 
reason for changing this additional system call is explained in the README.cybersinds 
file.  Figure 59 shows the output of the kern_check program on a system that is infected 
with the knark rootkit.   
 
 
Figure 59: kern_check results on system infected with knark for Linux 2.4 
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Analysis of these changed system calls using the kdb program listed the actual 
replacement system call labels.  Using the start addresses produced by the kern_check 
program made it possible to find the exact end point of each replacement system call 
even if the object file were not available.  This may be a result of how the knark program 
is compiled on this kernel or the newer version of kdb that is run on the Linux 2.4 kernel. 
Figure 60 shows the results of running kdb in this fashion. 
 
kdb>id 0xc48af5bb  -approximate endpoint of knark_getdents 
0xc48af5bb  knark_getdents+0123: jmp 0xc48af4fc  
0xc48af5c0  knark_getdents64:    push %ebp 
Figure 60: kdb output of system infected with knark 2.4.3 
 
The second line of output from the kdb program is the first line of the knark_getdents64 
replacement system call.  This address matches the address of the replacement system 
call as indicated by the kern_check program (Figure 59). 
This version of knark (knark-2.4.3) is based on a previous version (knark-0.59) and is a 
modification to that version. However, the kernel code copies of the eight modified 
system calls changed by both versions do not match.  This is most likely due to the fact 
that each version is installed on a different kernel.  This demonstrates that individuals 
following this methodology must be sure to use similar systems in their analysis. 
 A.8 The SuckIT rootkit 
The SuckIT rootkit was developed  by sd and devik based on the article they wrote in 
PHRACK vol. 58, article 7, titled “Linux–on-the-fly kernel patching without LKM”.   
This article discusses a methodology for modifying the system calls within the Linux 
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kernel without the use of LKM support or the /boot/System.map file [78].    Unlike kernel 
level rootkits that modify the system call table, this type of rootkit keeps the original 
system call table intact.  An examination of the original system call table will not indicate 
that the system has been compromised by a kernel level rootkit.    The SuckIT kernel 
level rootkit accomplishes this by modifying the System Call Interrupt (system_call() 
function) that is triggered whenever a User Mode process invokes a system call [79].   
The pointer to the normal system call table is changed to the address of the new system 
call table that is created by the SuckIT rootkit.  This new system call table contains the 
addresses of the malicious system calls that are modified by the SuckIT rootkit  as well as 
the original addresses of any unmodified system calls.  Our methodology retrieves the 
address of the system call table that is stored within the System Call Interrupt and checks 
this table for modifications.  Any modification to this table as well as a mismatch 
between this retrieved address and the address of the system call table that is maintained 
within the /boot/System.map file will also indicate that redirection of the system call table 
is occurring within the kernel.    
We continued to follow our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.   
The AIDE program did not detect any file modifications after the SuckIT rootkit was 
installed on the target system.  However, the AIDE program does detect that one file now 
has attributes that differ from the attributes that are stored in the original AIDE database.  
The file in question is the /sbin/telinit file.  The most recent version of the chkrootkit 
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program (released on 27 DEC 2003) did detect the presence of the SuckIT rootkit.    This 
new version of chkrootkit detects that the /sbin/init file is infected by checking for the 
presence of the text string “init.” within the /proc/1/maps file.  This file contains lists of 
libraries, executables, and other files that make up the text image of the init process that 
is currently running on the target system [80]. Figure 61 shows the output of the 
chkrootkit program on a system that is infected with the SuckIT rootkit.    The third line 
of output shows that the /sbin/init file has been modified.  It is significant to note that 
other rootkits that are based on SuckIT will most likely trigger the same indication. 
 
 
Figure 61: chkrootkit detecting SuckIT 
 
 The SuckIT rootkit changes 25 system calls.  This is more that any previous kernel 
rootkit that we have examined.    The ktext files now differ on a target system that is 
infected with SuckIT.  In fact, once a system is infected with SuckIt, every subsequent 
ktext file will differ from its previous version upon system reboot.  This is because 
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SuckIT is resident in memory and will modify each kernel text segment in a different 
fashion.  Unlike knark and adore, the SuckIt rootkit does not modify the original system 
call table of addresses that is maintained within kernel memory.  Instead, SuckIT creates 
an entirely new instance of the system call table in kernel memory and redirects all 
subsequent system call references to this new table.  Upon reboot this new system call 
table is placed at a different address in kernel memory causing the ktext file to differ.  
This type of rootkit was described in section 2.4.2.    It is necessary to retrieve the address 
of this newly created system call table to check the validity of the system calls.  Figure 62 
shows the results of checking the system call table that is used by a target system infected 
with the SuckIT rootkit. 
 
Figure 62: kern_check results on system infected with SuckIT 
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Our examination of the SuckIT rootkit revealed to us the first difference, or ∇  in 
functionality between SuckIT and the program that it replaces.  SuckIT overwrites a 
location in kernel memory that contains the address of the system call table.    SuckIT is 
able to accomplish this by querying a specific register within the processor.   It then use 
this information to find the entry point address within the kernel for the system call table 
and overwrites this address with the address of a new system call table containing the 
addresses of some malicious system calls that SuckIT also creates.   
One of the key features of the SuckIT rootkit is its ability to identify the correct location 
to overwrite within the kernel memory.   The SuckIT rootkit uses the following segment 
of code within the install.c program file  to do this: 
asm ("sidt %0" : "=m" (idtr)); 
 printf("RK_Init: idt=0x%08x, ", (uint) idtr.base); 
 if (ERR(rkm(fd, &idt80, sizeof(idt80), 
  idtr.base + 0x80 * sizeof(idt80)))) { 
  printf("IDT table read failed (offset   
0x%08x)\n", 
   (uint) idtr.base); 
  close(fd); 
  return 1; 
 } 
 old80 = idt80.off1 | (idt80.off2 << 16); 
 sct = get_sct(fd, old80, sctp); 
This code works by querying the processor for the address of the Interrupt Descriptor 
Table.  The SuckIT program uses the sidt command to accomplish this.    The sidt 
command is part of the Instruction Set for the INTEL Pentium (x86) Architecture. The 
purpose of this command is to store the Interrupt Descriptor Table Register (idtr) in the 
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destination operand [81].   A different command would be required if Linux were 
implemented on an architecture that differed from the INTEL Pentium (x86) architecture.   
SuckIT was written to run on this architecture.   This rootkit first makes use of the 
asm(“sidt %0 : “=m” (idtr)); command.   The asm command signifies to the compiler that 
assembly language instructions are being used.   This command returns the address of the 
Interrupt Descriptor Table within kernel memory.  This address is then printed out by the 
printf("RK_Init: idt=0x%08x, ", (uint) idtr.base); command.   The next series of 
commands is where the program retrieves the actual address of the System Call Interrupt 
(system_call() function) from the Interrupt Descriptor Table. To invoke this function 
within Linux, the int $0x80 assembly instruction must be invoked.  The install.c program 
calls a function rkm that reads kernel memory with the following line of code:               
rkm(fd,&idt80,sizeof(idt80),idtr.base+0x80*sizeof(idt80)) 
This functions returns a pointer to the Interrupt Descriptor of the System Call Function 
(int $0x80).  The program is now able to compute the entry point of the System Call 
function within kernel memory.  This is accomplished by the following code:   old80 = 
idt80.off1 | (idt80.off2 << 16);.    However, this entry point does not provide the actual 
memory location that needs to be overwritten by the SuckIT rootkit to redirect any 
system calls to a malicious system call table that is created by the rootkit.    We can 
examine the System Call Function assembly code within the kernel image (vmlinux) 
loaded at boot up by utilizing the resident code debugger (gdb: the GNU debugger) that 
exists within Red Hat Linux [78]. 
A specific system call function is invoked by the following:   
call *sys_call_table(,%eax,4).  
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The %eax register contains the number of the specific system call that is being called by 
the user program.   Each entry in the system call table is four bytes long.  To find the 
address of the system call that is to be invoked it is necessary to multiply the system call 
number (value stored in %eax register) by 4 (address size for 32 bit address) and add the 
result to the initial address of the system call table [83].  By examining this dump code, 
we see that the assembly code at 
$ gdb -q /boot/vmlinux 
 
(gdb) disass system_call 
Dump of assembler code for function system_call: 
0xc01070fc <system_call>: push   %eax 
0xc01070fd <system_call+1>: cld     
0xc01070fe <system_call+2>: push   %es 
0xc01070ff <system_call+3>: push   %ds 
0xc0107100 <system_call+4>: push   %eax 
0xc0107101 <system_call+5>: push   %ebp 
0xc0107102 <system_call+6>: push   %edi 
0xc0107103 <system_call+7>: push   %esi 
0xc0107104 <system_call+8>: push   %edx 
0xc0107105 <system_call+9>: push   %ecx 
0xc0107106 <system_call+10>: push   %ebx 
0xc0107107 <system_call+11>: mov    $0x18,%edx 
0xc010710c <system_call+16>: mov    %edx,%ds 
0xc010710e <system_call+18>: mov    %edx,%es 
0xc0107110 <system_call+20>: mov    $0xffffe000,%ebx 
0xc0107115 <system_call+25>: and    %esp,%ebx 
0xc0107117 <system_call+27>: testb  $0x2,0x18(%ebx) 
0xc010711b <system_call+31>: jne    0xc010717c <tracesys> 
0xc010711d <system_call+33>: cmp    $0x100,%eax 
0xc0107122 <system_call+38>: jae    0xc01071a9 <badsys> 
0xc0107128 <system_call+44>: call   *0xc02d1890(,%eax,4) 
0xc010712f <system_call+51>: mov    %eax,0x18(%esp,1) 
0xc0107133 <system_call+55>: nop     
End of assembler dump. 
 
(gdb) print &sys_call_table 
$1 = (<data variable, no debug info> *) 0xc02d1890 
(gdb) x/xw (system_call+44) 
0xc0107128 <system_call+44>: 0x908514ff 
 
location 0xc0107128 (<system_call+44>: call *0xc02d1890(,%eax,4)) corresponds to 
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this command since we have also demonstrated that the value stored at the system call 
table = 0xc02d1890.    We now wish to examine the memory at location 
<system_call+44>.  We utilize the x/Format  Address command  within gdb to do this.  
The exact format used is: (gdb) x/xw (system_call+44) where xw – hex format word size 
[78].   The output of this command is 0x908514ff which is opcode in little endian format.  
The opcode 0xff 0x14 0x85  0x<address of the System Call Table>  matches to the 
pattern ‘call  *some address ( ,%eax, 4)’ .  This opcode pattern gives the SuckIt rootkit a 
specific pattern to search for within /dev/kmem.  The address that follows this series of 
opcode is then changed by SuckIT to the address of the new System Call Table that the 
rootkit creates.   Current LKM detectors do not check the consistency  of the int $0x80 
function [78].  We find this to be significant because we propose that like SuckIT, one 
can query the int $0x80 function to retrieve the current pointer to the System Call Table 
that is in use within the kernel and then check the integrity of this System Call Table to 
determine if this system has been infected with a kernel level rootkit of either type.   
We have analyzed of the opcode series /xff/x14/x85/  to be sure that this will 
consistently be the opcode that SuckIT will need to search for to find the correct spot to 
modify the pointer to the System Call Table within /dev/kmem.   According to the 
description of the Instruction Set of the INTEL Embedded Pentium ® Processor Family, 
the Opcode for the Call Instruction that we have seen from the disassembly of the 
system_call function is as follows: 
Opcode Instruction  Description 
FF/2  CALL r/m32  Call near, absolute indirect,  address given in r/m32 
The first opcode: xff, symbolizes the CALL instruction.  The second opcode: x14, is in 
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the ModR/M byte of the instruction and symbolizes that a SIB byte follows this byte.  
The third opcode; x85, is in the SIB byte and symbolizes the 32 addressing format that is 
to be used, in this case [EAX*4].      This series of opcode should not change between 
kernel versions  as long as the INTEL Embedded Pentium ® Processor  is used in the 
hardware platform[81].  
A problem with using gdb to view this data is that the vmlinux kernel image that is used 
as input may not be an actual representation of what is currently loaded in the kernel.    A 
kernel level rootkit may modify the kernel without changing any of the system files that 
are resident on the computer’s file system to include the vmlinux file.  A check of the 
current ktext segment against a previously archived clean version of the ktext will 
indicate that the kernel may have been compromised in some fashion.  You will still be 
able to determine that the system call table has been tampered with by comparing the 
address of the system call table that is returned from querying the Interrupt Descriptor 
Table using the sidt assembly language command and comparing this value against the 
value that is retrieved from the vmlinux file and/or the address of the System Call Table 
(sys_call_table) that is stored in /boot/System.map if these files are available.  It is 
possible to view the actual data that is loaded into the kernel by using a program such as 
kdb, which is a kernel level debugger.  If this program is available it is very easy to 
examine the kernel memory to view modifications.   The following is an example of 
using kdb to display the instructions stored at a location in kernel memory: 
kdb> id 0xc0107128 
0xc0107128  system_call+0x2c: call *0xc02d1890( ,%eax,4) 
 




kdb> md 0xc0107128 
0xc0107128  908514ff  89c02d18 90182444  147b83f0 
A.9 The zk rootkit 
The zk rootkit was developed by zaRwT@zaRwt.net. The documentation for this 
rootkit states that many of the features concerning patching of the kernel (/dev/kmem 
“Patching”) were borrowed from  SuckIT.  Therefore, we would expect that it is possible 
to detect the  zk rootkit using the methods that we have already presented.  However,  the 
documentation talks about additional features that are different from what is contained in 
SuckIT.  Our preliminary belief is that zk is a modification to the already existing SuckIT 
rootkit. 
We once again followed our methodology in conducting an analysis of this rootkit.  The 
standard initial steps were taken prior to infecting a system with this rootkit to include 
running the AIDE file integrity check program, copying the kernel text code segment, 
and running the chkrootkit program.   
The AIDE program does detect that a file has been modified by this rootkit.  This is 
different from the behavior of the AIDE program on a system that has been infected with 
SuckIT, which did not detect any file modifications.  The file detected as being modified 
is the /sbin/ifconfig file.  The AIDE program also detects that the file /sbin/inetcfg has 
been added to the system.  The /sbin/init file is also detected as being modified by the 
most recent version (v-0.43) of the chkrootkit program as was the case with the SuckIT 
rootkit.  In addition, this most recent version of chkrootkit detects that the system is 
infected with the zk rootkit.  It accomplishes this by searching for a particular file 
(load.zk) that is appended with the default file hiding string (‘.zk’).  Any files  that 
contain this string is hidden from general display by the kernel level rootkit.   These files 
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are still accessible if you access them via their exact filename.  If the file hiding string is 
changed to something other than ‘.zk’ then chkrootkit will not detect them.  The 
chkrootkit program also detects other anomalies with the infected system.  These are 
potential deltas ( ∇ ) that can be used to characterize the zk rootkit.    Figure  63 shows the 
results of running the chkrootkit program (v-0.43) on the system that has been infected 
with the zk rootkit.    
 
 
Figure 63:  chkrootkit results on zk infected system 
 
Like the SuckIT rootkit, the zk  rootkit changes 25 system calls.    These 25 system calls 
are the same as those that are changed by SuckIT.  These new replacement system calls 
are written into kernel memory in the same order as those from SuckIT, however, the zk 
replacement system calls, with the exception of execve,  differ in size from the SuckIT 
replacement system calls.  An examination of the zk source code indicates that the 
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developer changed some of the code in the portions of the zk rootkit originally based on 
the SuckIT rootkit.  This is the most likely reason for the change in system call sizes and 
is another potential delta ( ∇ ).    Figure 64 shows the results of checking the system call 
table that is used by a target system infected with the zk rootkit. 
 
 
Figure 64: kern_check results on system infected with the zk rootkit 
 
The ktext files differ on a target system that is infected with zk which is the same 
behavior as SuckIT.  The zk rootkit performs in a manner similar to SuckIT upon system 
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reboot in that each subsequent ktext file will differ from the previous version.   
Unlike the SuckIT rootkit, we were not able to uninstall the zk rootkit program.  This is 
another indication that SuckIT and zk are not the same.  We then looked to identify this 
specific ∇ between these two programs concerning the uninstall process.  One of the first 
things that we noticed is that when we try to run the uninstall command on the zk rootkit 
(# ./zk u),  a usage statement is output to the screen and the program does not uninstall as 
indicated in figure 65.  This is not the case with SuckIT, the  uninstall program for 
SuckIT (# ./sk u) is successful. 
 
 
Figure 65: Unsuccessful uninstall of zk rootkit 
 
To uninstall the zk rootkit, the usage statement indicates that a password must be used.  
There in no reference to this uninstall password within the zk rootkit documentation and 
there is no indication of how to set this password.  We used the zk usage statement to try 
and identify a ∇ . 
 We conducted a grep search for the term ‘password’ within the source code directory 
for the zk rootkit.  The results of this search indicate that the term ‘password’ exists 
within the client.c source code file.  A file by the same name exists for the SuckIT 
rootkit.  Comparing these two files using the resident diff command indicates that these 
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two files do in fact differ.  We then conducted a more complete search on the zk client.c 
file.  We identified a password ‘kill me’ within the client.c file  Figure 66 shows the 
results of this search. 
 
 
Figure 66: Uninstall password for zk rootkit 
We were then able to successfully uninstall the zk rootkit by using the following 
command: # ./zk u kill me.  Running the modified kern_check program on the system 
indicates that the system is no longer infected. 
The ability to examine both rootkits system allows you to continue to identify ∇ ’s, or 
differences between the two rootkits.  The string ‘kill me’ can be used as a signature to 
detect instances of the zk rootkit.     Other potential signatures can be identified from both 
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